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The Lost Language of the First
Amendment in Copyright Fair Use:
A Semiotic Perspective of the
“Transformative Use” Doctrine
Twenty-Five Years On
David Tan*
It has been twenty-five years since Judge Pierre Leval published his
iconic article, “Toward a Fair Use Standard,” urging that courts adopt
a new guiding principle of “transformative use” to determine whether
an unauthorized secondary use of a copyrighted work is fair. The Supreme Court’s emphatic endorsement of this approach in 1994 has resulted in a remarkable judicial expansion of the transformative use doctrine which today covers virtually any “creation of new information,
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.” While the Supreme
Court reiterated in Golan v. Holder in 2012 that the fair use defense is
one of copyright law’s key “built-in First Amendment accommodations,” the influence of the First Amendment on the transformative use
doctrine remains largely unexplored over the years. This Article analyzes
how the different theoretical underpinnings of the First Amendment and
certain categories of First Amendment-protected speech have been accommodated within the transformative use doctrine, and shows how the
First Amendment has been—and will continue to be—the invisible hand
that shapes the development of copyright law. It also addresses the unre*
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lenting frustration in assessing transformative use and urges a consideration for assistance from a semiotic perspective of the First Amendment
to illuminate what really are cultural contestations of semiotic signs
masquerading as copyright disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
First Amendment jurisprudence is replete with symbolic expression that qualifies for constitutional protection. The Supreme
Court has explicitly acknowledged that burning the American flag
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can be construed as a legitimate form of political protest,1 and placing a burning cross on the fenced yard of a black family connotes
“virulent notions of racial supremacy” but is nonetheless a protected expression of particular ideas.2 However, in a copyright dispute, while spray-painting a red cross over the image of a screaming face in a music video was seen to convey a critical message
about the hypocrisy of religion, there was no mention of the First
Amendment.3 Similarly, replacing the romantic lyrics of “Oh, Pretty Woman” with tawdry ones was perceived to be a “comment on
the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement
that it signifies,”4 but there was no reference to its contribution to
the marketplace of ideas.5
In 2014, the Supreme Court in McCullen v. Coakley reiterated
that the primary purpose of the First Amendment is “to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.”6 In the same year, the Court also highlighted in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission that there is “no right more
basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our
political leaders”7 and that the “First Amendment safeguards an
individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political expression and political association.”8 The Supreme Court has
exhorted that First Amendment standards “must give the benefit
of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”9
1

E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (“We have had little difficulty
identifying an expressive element in conduct relating to flags . . . . The very purpose of a
national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country; it is, one might say, the one visible
manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood.”).
2
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356–57, 363, 389–91 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392, 394 (1992).
3
Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013).
4
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
5
Id.
6
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (citing FCC v. League of Women
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)).
7
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014).
8
Id. at 1448 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
9
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 327 (2010); see also Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
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Although political speech, or conduct expressing a clear political message, enjoys heightened First Amendment protection, the
Supreme Court has found that literature, music, and the visual and
performing arts also qualify for constitutional protection even in
the absence of conveying a clear political message or touching on a
matter of public concern. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, the Supreme Court held that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a particularized message would never reach the unquestionably shielded
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”10
Hurley poses some important theoretical questions about the
rationale for extending First Amendment protection to literary,
musical, dramatic and artistic works, and consequently the enforcement of copyright and its potential chilling effect on freedom
of speech. However, while First Amendment case law, in terms of
challenging the constitutional validity of state action, is filled with
references to the constitutionally protected status of literary, musical, dramatic, and artistic works,11 courts have rarely discussed the
underlying rationales for such protection in copyright litigation.
The tension between copyright interests and the First Amendment
is apparent. The Copyright Act, enacted by Congress under the
authority of the U.S. Constitution’s Copyright Clause, grants individuals monopoly-like power to preclude others from using copy10

Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(internal citation omitted).
11
See Nat’l Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998)
(“Constitutional protection of artistic works turns not on the political significance that
may be attributable to such productions, though they may indeed comment on the
political, but simply on their expressive character.”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d
689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Paintings, photographs, prints and sculptures . . . are entitled to
full First Amendment protection.”); Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 759 F.2d 625, 628
(7th Cir. 1985) (“The First Amendment has been interpreted to embrace purely artistic
as well as political expression.”); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501 (1952) (protecting motion pictures that “may affect public attitudes and behavior in a
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression”); David Greene, Why
Protect Political Art as “Political Speech”?, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 362
(2005) (explaining that visual art falls under the aegis of the First Amendment).
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righted material in their expression.12 It is this “paradox” that
creates the tension: copyright laws grant a copyright owner the
right to suppress or abridge another person’s freedom of speech
when that person seeks to express copyrighted material. However,
on a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected any further independent consideration of the impact of the First Amendment on copyright law, pronouncing that “copyright law contains
built-in First Amendment accommodations.”13 As a “traditional
contour” of copyright law, the Court had held that the “fair use
defense affords considerable latitude for scholarship and comment . . . even for parody.”14 Justice Ginsburg, delivering the opinion of the Court in Golan v. Holder, emphasized the “‘speechprotective purposes and safeguards’ embraced by copyright law”15
and assured that the public may freely use the author’s expression
“in certain circumstances.”16 Unfortunately, in all the decisions
concerning challenges to copyright legislation passed by Congress,
the Supreme Court did not elaborate on how First Amendment jurisprudence might actually be relevant in determining the ambit of
such safeguards.17
Indeed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Golan makes it clear that
the fair use defense has “constitutional import” and “reaffirms
that copyright law poses a First Amendment paradox that cannot
be ignored.”18 This Article adopts the premise that the key under12

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873,
890 (2012); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
14
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20.
15
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219); see generally Matthew D.
Bunker, Adventures in the Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Absence of Independent First
Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273
(2009); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech,
Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987).
16
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219).
17
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186 (concerning the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act
extending the duration of copyrights by twenty years); see also Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873
(concerning section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act granting copyright
protection to works protected in their country of origin, but lacking protection in the
United States).
18
Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright after Golan v.
Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1128 (2013).
13
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lying rationales of the First Amendment are the promotion of a
marketplace of ideas and the advancement of a democracy where
the public can freely participate in deliberating issues important to
decisionmaking in a democracy (a “participatory democracy”). It
contends that in many decisions that have applied the transformative use doctrine in extending the fair use privilege to infringing
works, the results are often compatible with, and perhaps even influenced by, covert First Amendment considerations.
A well-known literary or artistic work does much more than
simply educate, inform, or entertain, but it also functions as a signifier of a set of signified meanings. As many famous copyrighted
works are important semiotic signs in contemporary society, I further propose that the augmentation of these theories of the First
Amendment with semiotic insights is likely to lead to better outcomes in cases because more speech of “greater” constitutional
value is protected (i.e., speech that contributes to an increased
awareness and debate of public issues). “Interdisciplinarity has become a transforming force within legal studies,” and its advantages
have been well canvassed.19 Ideological discourses of a particular
society can be classified and framed through semiotic signs
represented by well-known copyrighted works. A particular work
that is symbolic of a privileged public identity can be seen to
represent a majoritarian ideological position—a form of “frozen
speech”20—and is, therefore, open to a recoding challenge by others to express their cultural identities and convey their political
ideologies.21 For example, a challenge to the ideas embodied in the
Gone With The Wind novel may be presented in the form of another
novel titled The Wind Done Gone which uses the characters in the
original novel but portrays them differently in order to make “a
19

See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY

AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY xii (2001).

20

ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 124 (Annette Lavers trans., 1972) (1957).
More recently, recoding—in a copyright context—has been defined to be “the
appropriation of a copyrighted cultural object for new expression in a way that ascribes a
different meaning to it than intended by its creator.” See Note, “Recoding” and the
Derivative Works Entitlement: Addressing the First Amendment Challenge, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1488, 1488 (2006); see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a
Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597
(2007).
21
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critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective,
judgments, and mythology of [the original work]” and “to explode
the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and
after the Civil War.”22 This Article suggests that free speech interests may be enhanced by a pragmatic understanding of semiotics
that seeks to attain a “wide reflective equilibrium [that is] firmly
grounded in constitutional reality.”23
In U.S. fair use jurisprudence, the first statutory factor of fair
use—the “purpose and character of the use”—is examined in the
context of the transformative nature of the infringing work. Generally, a transformative work is one that imbues the original “with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.”24 According to the Supreme
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., transformativeness not
only occupies the core of the fair use doctrine but also reduces the
importance of all other factors such that “the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”25
Part I examines the current scope of the first factor of fair use as
codified in section 107 of the United States Copyright Act 1976. It
traces the judicial development of the “transformative use” doctrine as articulated by Pierre Leval twenty-five years ago and highlights the dispositive force that this concept commands today in the
fair use analysis. It further argues that copyright fair use jurisprudence today, in particular the decisions of the Second and Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, despite having virtually no reference to
the First Amendment, is nonetheless highly protective of speech.
Part II will show that First Amendment jurisprudence, especially Supreme Court decisions, while consistently paying tribute to
a marketplace of ideas, inevitably supports an overarching approach to the First Amendment in terms of a participatory theory
that places the highest constitutional value on political speech. It
contends that that many works protected by copyright law also
possess significant sets of established meanings and connotations to
22
23
24
25

Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001).
BUNKER, supra note 19, at 197.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
Id.
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the public which utilize these works in the expressive process of
social identity formation and democratic discourse, with these secondary works falling clearly within protected categories of speech.
Part III interrogates how the prevailing test of whether the original copyrighted work was employed “in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” has
not only adequately accommodated the First Amendment, but is in
fact driven by an underlying free speech ethos that is evident in
other areas of intellectual property like trademark and right of publicity laws. It postulates that viewing copyrighted works as semiotic
signs can assist both the development of First Amendment and
copyright jurisprudence. Using well-known cartoon and superhero
characters, it illustrates how an evaluation of “transformative use”
essentially embeds notions of sustaining a vibrant marketplace of
ideas and promoting participatory democracy within copyright fair
use analysis. It also highlights the recoding potential of famous
works, especially as used by subaltern groups or counterpublics as
an integral part of political and social identity formation. This Article concludes that this approach to fair use allows greater breathing space for the First Amendment within copyright jurisprudence,
and it can better protect political speech in a manner that more effectively negotiates the competing right of the copyright owner to
exploit the commercial value of his or her work, and the right of the
public to use the work as an expressive communicative symbolic
resource in a participatory democracy.
I. PIERRE LEVAL’S TRANSFORMATIVE USE DOCTRINE—
THEN & NOW
The fair use defense is widely believed to have its American
origins in Justice Story’s test for a fair and bona fide abridgement
as set out in his 1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh.26 If prima facie
copyright infringement was found, the fair use defense as codified
in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act can nonetheless provide a
safe harbor for the defendant, especially if transformative elements
may be discerned in the infringing work.
26

9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
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Section 107 states:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.27
A. Pierre Leval’s Transformative Use Doctrine in 1990
Pierre Leval, then a judge of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, published an influential article in 1990 that considered whether imprecision—the absence of
a clear standard—in fair use doctrine was a strength or a weakness.28 Leval noted that “throughout the development of the fair
use doctrine, courts had failed to fashion a set of governing principles or values”29 but was concerned that fair use “should be perceived not as a disorderly basket of exceptions to the rules of copyright, nor as a departure from the principles governing that body of
law, but rather as a rational, integral part of copyright.”30 Referring
to the Copyright Clause,31 he argued that by lumping together authors and inventors, writings and discoveries, the express text suggests the rough equivalence of these two activities, and therefore

27
28
29
30
31

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1107.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the goal of both copyright and patent laws is utilitarian in nature.
More specifically, copyright law:
[E]mbodies a recognition that creative intellectual
activity is vital to the well-being of society. It is a
pragmatic measure by which society confers monopoly-exploitation benefits for a limited duration on
authors and artists (as it does for inventors), in order to obtain for itself the intellectual and practical
enrichment that results from creative endeavors.32
Leval acknowledged that monopoly protection of intellectual
property that restricted referential analysis and the development of
new ideas out of the old would strangle the creative process, and
thought that the idea-expression dichotomy, facts-exclusion rule
and fair use doctrine all provided a counterbalance. In particular,
he advocated instilling a coherent and useful set of principles in the
fair use doctrine, such that “the use must be of a character that
serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought
and public instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.”33
In his analysis of the four statutory fair use factors, Leval was of
the view that factor one—the “purpose and character of the
use”—is the “soul of fair use.”34 Explaining that this consideration raises the question of justification (i.e., “Does the use fulfill
the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public illumination?”35), he emphasized that the answer turns primarily on
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.
Leval frames the inquiry as follows:
The use must be productive and must employ the
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original . . . . [If] the secondary
use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter
is used as raw material, transformed in the creation
of new information, new aesthetics, new insights
32
33
34
35

Leval, supra note 28, at 1109.
Id. at 1109–10.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1111.
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and understandings—this is the very type of activity
that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the
enrichment of society.36
Leval also provided some examples of transformative use which
included “criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of
the original author, . . . or summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it” and “parody, symbolism, [and]
aesthetic declarations.”37 Interestingly, while Leval conceded that
“copyright often results in suppression of speech,”38 he avoided
any discussion of the First Amendment and peremptorily declared
“the Framers intended copyright . . . to be the engine of free expression”39 and it “is intended to increase and not to impeded the
harvest of knowledge.”40
B. The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of Transformative Use in 1994
The phrase “transformative use” has surged into prominence
in fair use jurisprudence ever since the Supreme Court in 1994 embraced transformativeness as the cynosure of fair use in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.41 The decision is important in its emphasis
on how a highly transformative use of an original work may qualify
the secondary infringing work for fair use protection even if the latter was commercial in nature, rebutting earlier presumptions in
cases like Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises42 and Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios.43
In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote a rock ballad
called “Oh, Pretty Woman” and assigned their rights in it to
Acuff-Rose Music. In 1989, Luke Campbell, from the controversial
36

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
38
Id. at 1135.
39
Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985)).
40
Id. (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545).
41
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The controversial rap
group 2 Live Crew sampled the distinctive bass line from Roy Orbison’s original hit song
“Pretty Woman,” used the same title for their parody song, and replaced the romantic
lyrics with talk about a big hairy woman and her exploits. Id. at 582, 588.
42
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539.
43
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
37
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rap group 2 Live Crew, wrote a song entitled “Pretty Woman,”
which was intended, “through comical lyrics, to satirize the original work.”44 The manager of 2 Live Crew wrote to Acuff-Rose offering to pay a license fee for the use of the original song, but AcuffRose refused permission. Nonetheless, 2 Live Crew proceeded to
release records, cassette tapes, and compact discs of the parody
song “Pretty Woman” in a collection of songs entitled As Clean As
They Wanna Be. The albums and compact discs identify the authors of “Pretty Woman” as Orbison and Dees and its publisher as
Acuff-Rose. Almost a year later, after nearly a quarter of a million
copies of the recording had been sold, Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live
Crew and its record company for copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew on the
ground of fair use and held that 2 Live Crew’s version was a parody
that “quickly degenerates into a play on words, substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones” to show “how bland and banal
the Orbison song” is. The court also found that 2 Live Crew had
taken no more of the original than was necessary to “conjure up”
the original in order to parody it, and that it was “extremely unlikely that 2 Live Crew’s song could adversely affect the market for the
original.”45 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
and remanded, observing that the district court had put too little
emphasis on the fact that “every commercial use . . . is presumptively . . . unfair,”46 and that the effect on the potential market for
the original (and the market for derivative works) is “undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use.”47
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Souter, writing for a
unanimous court, examined the legislative history of 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 and concluded that the first factor in a fair use inquiry—“the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”—
should be examined with reference to its transformative nature in

44

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a).
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154–55, 1157–58 (M.D.
Tenn. 1991).
46
Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 451.
47
Harper & Row, 471 U.S at 566.
45
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the manner that Pierre Leval has argued in his 1990 law review article. Justice Souter held:
The central purpose of this investigation is to
see . . . whether the new work merely “supersede[s]
the objects” of the original creation (“supplanting”
the original), or instead adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it
asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the
new work is “transformative.”48
More emphatically, Justice Souter laid the groundwork for the
transformative use doctrine—especially for commercial parodies,
appropriation art, and fan communities—to flourish over the next
two decades:
[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of
the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space
within the confines of copyright, . . . and the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.49
In response to the Campbell decision, Pierre Leval hailed Justice Souter’s opinion as “perceptive and profound” and was delighted that it had “restored order and good sense to fair use”50; he
also believed that it was “the finest opinion ever written on the
subject of fair use.”51 In particular, Leval thought it was important
that the Souter opinion “kills the canard that commercial use is
presumptively unfair.”52 Although the Campbell decision downplayed the commerciality of the infringing use and directed the inquiry to the transformativeness of secondary work, it nevertheless
48

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 28, at 1111 (internal citations
omitted)).
49
Id.
50
Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1451
(1997).
51
Id. at 1464.
52
Id.
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generated tremendous confusion in respect of the application of the
transformative use doctrine to parodic and satirical works. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court only provided one concrete example
of a sufficiently transformative use that would clearly lead to a fair
use determination, that of parody. Justice Souter usefully suggested that the “threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be
perceived.”53 Regarding the “Pretty Woman” song in dispute, Justice Souter conceded that it would not be “assign[ed] a high rank
to the parodic element here,” but found that 2 Live Crew’s song
“reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or
criticizing it, to some degree.”54
Over the years, lower courts have bluntly asserted that because
a parody targets and comments on the original work, it is therefore
transformative; on the other hand, a satire uses the original work as
a weapon to comment on something else and is thus not transformative.55 But the Campbell court did not state that in order for a use
to be transformative it must always comment on the original. Justice Souter explained that “[p]arody needs to mimic an original to
make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand
on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of
borrowing.”56

53
54

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.
Id. at 583. Justice Souter was of the view that:
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy
comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a
sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be
taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as
a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and
the debasement that it signifies.

Id.
55

See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401
(9th Cir. 1997) (“It is the rule in this Circuit that though the satire need not be only of the
copied work and may . . . also be a parody of modern society, the copied work must be, at
least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the
original work.”).
56
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81. Justice Souter also commented that “parody often
shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative artifacts, or that a work
may contain both parodic and nonparodic elements.” Id. at 581.
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In a footnote, the Court clarified that:
[W]hen there is little or no risk of market substitution,
whether because of the large extent of transformation of
the earlier work, the new work’s minimal distribution
in the market, the small extent to which it borrows
from an original, or other factors, taking parodic aim
at an original is a less critical factor in the analysis, and
looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use,
as may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be required.57
This suggests that the degree or extent of transformation is the
salient feature of the first factor of fair use regardless of whether
the secondary use is classified as a parody, satire, or something
else.
With respect to the first factor of fair use, this approach requires courts to examine the “purpose and character of the use,”
but neither “purpose” nor “character” is defined in the statute.
Courts therefore may consider a kaleidoscope of relevant factors
like what kind of transformation is present in the secondary work,
the track record of the author of the secondary work, the extent of
commentary or criticism present in the secondary work, the significance of the secondary use to research or study, as well as its public benefit.58 Indeed, the transformative use doctrine in the first factor of fair use is a difficult one to elucidate. The phrase “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes” suggests that (a) a change in the purpose of the secondary infringing
work vis-à-vis the original work (i.e., from entertaining to educational) or a change in character (i.e., change in context or style) is
transformative; (b) such changes should be considered in the light
of the commerciality of the secondary infringing work, although
this examination overlaps with the fourth factor on market impact;
and (c) whether the secondary infringing work serves a commercial
or nonprofit purpose, is a separate consideration from the “pur57

Id. at 580 n.14 (emphasis added).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”).

58
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pose and character of the use.” Courts do not usually observe a
strict distinction between “purpose” and “character,” preferring
to assess whether the secondary work was sufficiently transformative according to the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in
Campbell.
C. The Ascendancy of Transformative Use from 1994–2015
The transformative use test has become the defining standard
for fair use, and it has risen to the top of the agenda of the copyright academic community in the United States in the last five
years.59 Jane Ginsburg, in her review of the most significant developments in copyright law in the period 1992–2012, concludes that
the last twenty years have marked the “extraordinary expansion”
of the fair use doctrine, and in particular, the concept of transformative use, with recent cases demonstrating a shift from focusing
on finding a “transformative work” to discovering a “transformative purpose.”60At least four empirical studies of United States fair
use case law offer valuable insights to the transformative use doctrine.
Barton Beebe’s pioneering empirical study of fair use decisions
in the United States, which covered judicial opinions from 1978 to
2005,61 and Matthew Sag’s statistical analysis, which focused on
the ex ante predictability of fair use based on 280 fair use cases decided between 1978 and 2011,62 affirm the important role that
transformative use—a judicial inquiry in the first statutory factor of
the fair use inquiry when examining the “the purpose and character of the use”—plays in the evaluation of fair use. Beebe observed:
[I]n those opinions in which transformativeness did
play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive force not
59

See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation:
Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92 (2014); Michael D. Murray, What is Transformative?
An Explanatory Synthesis of the Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in
Copyright Fair Use Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260 (2012).
60
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright 1992–2012: The Most Significant Development?, 23
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 465, 487–89 (2013).
61
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008).
62
Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012).
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simply on the outcome of factor one but on the
overall outcome of the fair use test. More specifically, the data suggest that while a finding of transformativeness is not necessary to trigger an overall
finding of fair use, it is sufficient to do so.63
While courts have not demonstrated an overriding desire to
find transformativeness in the cases before them, Beebe concludes
that based on the regression analysis, if a use were found to be
transformative, the defendant’s chance of winning the fair use defense would be 94.9%.64 Sag more confidently asserts that the evidence “confirms the centrality of transformative use” and when
“[m]easured in terms of the variable Creativity Shift, it appears
that transformative use by the defendant is a robust predictor of a
finding of fair use.”65 Sag also concludes that an assessment of
transformativeness is “not merely a question of the degree of difference between two works; rather, it requires a judgment of the
motivation and meaning of those differences.”66
However, it is Neil Netanel’s study of U.S. district and circuit
court cases decided between 2006 and 2010 that is more conclusive
that “the transformative use paradigm ascended to its overwhelmingly predominant position only after 2005, following the period
that Beebe studied.”67 Although courts have repeatedly asserted
that a secondary use need not be transformative in order to be a fair
use, and that transformativeness as encapsulated in the first statutory fair use factor is merely a part, albeit a central part, of the fair
use inquiry, Netanel’s data reveals that there is certainly a strikingly high correlation between judicial findings regarding transformativeness and fair use outcomes.68 The leading cases also “make
63

Beebe, supra note 61, at 605.
Id. at 606.
65
Sag, supra note 62, at 84.
66
Id. at 56.
67
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715,
734 (2011).
68
Id. at 742. Twenty of the twenty-two opinions that found the defendant’s use to be
“highly,” “certainly,” or “significantly” transformative, or just simply
“transformative,” held that the defendant had engaged in fair use. All but three cases that
characterized the secondary use in question as non-transformative, or only “minimally,”
“partly,” or “somewhat” transformative, found no fair use. Id. at 740–41.
64
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quite clear that, in effect, if the first factor favors fair use, that will
trump the fourth factor.”69
Finally, Michael Murray’s explanatory synthesis methodology,
a process of induction of principles of interpretation and application concerning the prevailing rules governing a specific legal issue,
has been applied to the entire body of copyright fair use case law
from the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals since 1994.70 His study
revealed that “placing [existing copyrighted work] in a new context
so as to change the predominant purpose and function of the original
material is transformative.”71 In Murray’s explanatory synthesis of
decisions rendered by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, he concludes:
A change in context for an artistic work even without any changes to the content of the work may be
sufficient if the predominant purpose and function
of the new work is sufficiently different from the
original work and fulfills one of the [principal] goals
of the copyright laws.72
Although Campbell involved parody, where the rap group 2
Live Crew directly commented on the original “Oh, Pretty Woman” song by Roy Orbison, the Supreme Court did not hold or even
suggest that transformativeness is limited to new works that parody
the original or comment on it directly. In Campbell, the Court observed that section 107 “employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such
as’ in the preamble paragraph to indicate the ‘illustrative and not
limitative’ function of the examples given, which thus provide only
general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair uses.”73 It is clear that if
Congress had intended to impose a requirement that all secondary
69

Id. at 743. This is likely to be a result of the conclusion that if a secondary use is
unequivocally transformative, then, by definition, it causes no market harm to or has
market substitution for the original work. Perhaps more controversially, Sag surmises that
the near-perfect correlation between judicial findings on the fourth factor and fair use case
outcomes must mean that the fourth factor is not really an independent variable in judges’
fair use analysis. See Sag, supra note 62, at 63–64.
70
Murray, supra note 59.
71
Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
72
Id. at 279.
73
Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994).
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works must comment, it would have done so by adding a comment
requirement as a conjunctive element, or by exclusively providing
that only those activities listed in section 107 can qualify as fair use.
Most of the Circuit Court decisions in the last decade on fair
use have hailed from the Second and Ninth Circuits, with a handful
from the Federal,74 First,75 Third,76 Fourth,77 Tenth,78 Seventh,79
and Eleventh80 Circuits, and virtually nothing of note from the
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. The Second Circuit has considered a broader examination of transformation that does not require the presence of comment so long as the purpose in using the
original work is “plainly different from the original purpose for
which [it was] created”81 and have “given weight to an artist’s own
explanation of their creative rationale when conducting the fair use
analysis.”82 The Second Circuit found in Blanch v. Koons that Jeff
Koons’ use of Andrea Blanch’s photograph to be transformative
even though he was not commenting on the underlying work but
using the original image “as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media.”83 The court expressly “disagree[d] with the suggestion that comment or criticism” is required to show transformative use,84 and emphasized
74

See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
See, e.g., Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st
Cir. 2012).
76
See, e.g., Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011).
77
See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2013); A.V. ex
rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
78
See, e.g., Shell v. DeVries, No. 07-1086, 2007 WL 4269047, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 6,
2007).
79
See, e.g., Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014); Brownmark
Films LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012).
80
See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
81
Blanch v. Koons (Koons II), 467 F.3d 244, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2006); Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006).
82
Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499, 507–08
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Koons II, 467 F.3d at 255).
83
Koons II, 467 F.3d at 253. It may be argued that Rogers v. Koons (Koons I), is of limited
precedential value as it was decided before Campbell, and there was no requirement in law
for a secondary work to comment on the original work so long as the intent of the
secondary author was to recode the original expression into entirely new expression with
new messages. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
84
Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 609.
75
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that the inquiry should be whether the secondary work may be reasonably perceived to have a meaning, message, or purpose that is
“separate and distinct” from the original,85 consistent with the
judgment in Campbell.86
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have also rejected a narrow requirement of commenting or criticizing the original work in order
to qualify as transformative use, directing the court instead to examine whether the infringing work has employed the copyrighted
work in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original, thus transforming it.87 Such a broader interpretation that focuses judicial inquiry on evaluating a change in purpose or change
in character can better unify the transformative use analysis for expressive parodic, satirical, or critical works and non-expressive
works in a technological medium like format- or time-shifting.
Moreover, from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com,88 it appears that in evaluating the first statutory factor,
courts may be inclined to assess the extent of the “transformative
nature” of the defendant’s secondary use “in light of its public
benefit,” and weigh that against the defendant’s “superseding and
commercial uses.”89 These decisions, taking a more permissive
view of fair use, have collectively resulted in allowing a significant
amount of expressive works to be made available to the public.

85

Id.; see also Koons II, 467 F.3d at 252; Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp.,
Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d. Cir. 1998).
86
Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Swatch Grp. Mgmt.
Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg LP, 742 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In the context of news
reporting and analogous activities, moreover, the need to convey information to the
public accurately may in some instances make it desirable and consonant with copyright
law for a defendant to faithfully reproduce an original work rather than transform it. In
such cases, courts often find transformation by emphasizing the altered purpose or
context of the work, as evidenced by surrounding commentary or criticism.”).
87
See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 932, 301 (4th Cir. 2010); A.V.
ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003).
88
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165.
89
Id. at 1166.
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The transformative use doctrine, as consistently articulated by
the Second Circuit for over a decade, was succinctly stated by the
court in 2013:
If the secondary use adds value to the original—if
[the original work] is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is
the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.90
This formulation was lifted verbatim from Leval’s 1990 article.91 The Second Circuit did not require the secondary work to
comment on the original work or on the original author/artist, so
long as a transformative nature may “reasonably be perceived.”92
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Campbell that the 2 Live Crew version of “Pretty Woman” could
“reasonably be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree” because “2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading
taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal
responsibility.”93 More importantly, the Ninth Circuit aligned itself with the Second Circuit in adopting Leval’s formulation—
whether “the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in
the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings”—in Seltzer v. Green Day in 2013.94 All Circuit
Courts have either directly cited the Leval formulation, Campbell,
or the Second Circuit’s 1998 decision of Castle Rock Entertainment,
Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc. as authority for the evaluation of
fair use. Generally, courts have found a transformative purpose
both where the defendant combines copyrighted expression with
90

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at
142); see also Koons II, 467 F.3d at 251–52. A recent decision of the Seventh Circuit was
less enamored with this approach. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758
(7th Cir. 2014) (“We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because asking exclusively
whether something is “transformative” not only replaces the list in [section] 107 but also
could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects derivative works.”).
91
Leval, supra note 28, at 1111.
92
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
93
Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
94
Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013).
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original expression to produce a new creative work, and where the
defendant uses a copyrighted work in a different context to serve a
different function than the original.95 When an “allegedly infringing work is typically viewed as transformative as long as new expressive content or message is apparent” (Ninth Circuit),96 or
when “[w]hat is critical is how the work in question appears to the
reasonable observer” (Second Circuit),97 the effect of this modified
Leval test of transformative use is highly protective of speech.
There are five broad categories of transformative uses that can
be said to demonstrate a change in “purpose” or “character” as
articulated in 17 U.S.C § 107. In summary, the following types of
uses have been found to be transformative:
(1) Directly commenting on or criticizing the
original work, or targeting the original work for
ridicule or parody;98
(2) Using the original work to comment on
something else or in a satire, but the secondary

95

Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1177.
97
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
98
See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (holding that the 2 Live Crew song can be taken as a
comment on the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that
ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies, and is therefore
transformative); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that
analyses and critiques of course manuals are transformative); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that, despite borrowing substantially
from Margaret Mitchell’s original novel, The Wind Done Gone was found to be a
transformative use of Gone With the Wind as it is a direct critique of Mitchell’s depiction
of slavery and the Civil-War era American South); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that the parody ad may reasonably be
perceived as commenting on the seriousness, even the pretentiousness, of the original).
But see Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that a poetic account of the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial entitled The Cat
NOT in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice was not transformative as The Cat in the Hat is not
conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or the O.J. Simpson trial);
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a fictional novel
recounting a meeting of Catcher in the Rye’s Holden Caulfield at the age of seventy-six
with the author of that same book, J.D. Salinger, was a substantial copy of the original
novel and was unlikely to constitute fair use).
96
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work nonetheless contains some underlying
critical relevance to the original work;99
(3) Recontextualizing the original work without
modification but changing the meaning of the
original work, often in an appropriation art
context;100
(4) Changing the purpose of the original work
within an expressive context (e.g., from
entertainment to education or research);101 and
99

See Koons II, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the use of an already
published photograph in a painting was transformative because it had an entirely different
purpose and meaning); Mattel Inc., v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.
2003) (finding that photographs portraying nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed with vintage
kitchen appliances are transformative as they comment on Barbie’s influence on gender
roles and the position of women in society). It has also been argued that fan fiction and fan
remix works belong in this category and should be protected as transformative fair use.
See generally David Tan, Harry Potter and the Transformation Wand: Fair Use, Canonicity
and Fan Activity, in AMATEUR MEDIA: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 94
(Dan Hunter et al. eds., 2012); Sonia Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of
Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 461 (2006); Rachel L.
Stroude, Complimentary Creation: Protecting Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 14 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 191 (2010).
100
See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.
2006) (finding that the use of promotional posters in a rock biography was a purpose
separate and distinct from the original artistic and promotional purpose for which the
images were created, and was transformative). There is arguably an overlap between
categories (c) and (d). Courts have yet to decide if appropriation art, in particular Sherrie
Levine’s rephotographs—where there is no modification to the original photograph, but
there is a transformation in meaning between the original and the secondary work that
may be reasonably perceived by the audience—qualify as transformative use. See generally
JOHANNA BURTON & ELISABETH SUSSMAN, SHERRIE LEVINE: MAYHEM (2012); HOWARD
SINGERMAN, ART HISTORY, AFTER SHERRIE LEVINE (Stephanie Fay et al. eds. 2011).
101
This category overlaps with the next one. The courts usually focus on whether there
was a change in purpose and whether there was significant public benefit to be gained
from the secondary infringing use. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., 508 F.3d
1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the automated processing and display of thumbnails of
copyrighted photos as part of a visual search engine was a change in purpose and
transformative); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that,
despite the fact that Arriba made exact replications of Kelly’s images, the thumbnails
served an entirely different function than Kelly’s original images and the use of the
images in the search engine was transformative); Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR
Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that, even though the overall
secondary work was found not to be consistently transformative, by “condensing,
synthesizing, and reorganizing the preexisting material in an A-to-Z reference guide, the
Lexicon does not recast the material in another medium to retell the story of Harry Potter,
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(5) Changing the purpose of the original work
within a technological context and with
significant social benefit.102
The types of uses in categories (1) to (5) are not mutually exclusive and they often overlap.103 For example, one may construe
the secondary work, The Wind Done Gone, by Alice Randall as a
change in character compared to Gone With The Wind (since it is a
critical comment that sets out to “demystify [Gone With The Wind]
and strip the romanticism from Mitchell’s specific account of this
period of our history”104), but not as a change in purpose (since
both are novels that entertain). Alternatively, one may perceive The
Wind Done Gone as being educational in purpose (since it is “principally and purposefully a critical statement that seeks to rebut and
destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology” of Gone With
The Wind105), hence demonstrating a change in purpose. Indeed,
the Eleventh Circuit intimated that categorization of a secondary

but instead gives the copyrighted material another purpose”). More recently, the Second
Circuit has unanimously held that “the purpose of Google’s copying of the original
copyrighted books is to make available significant information about those books, permitting
a searcher to identify those that contain a word or term of interest, as well as those that do
not include reference to it,” and the search function and snippet views were therefore
transformative. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir. 2015).
102
See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (holding
that the manufacturer of a videocassette recorder was not liable for copyright
infringement in part because consumer time-shifting of broadcast television for later
viewing was transformative and was fair use); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC,
562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that the automated processing of the plaintiff
students’ work in defendant’s plagiarism detection software was transformative);
Recording Indus. Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir. 1999) (strongly suggesting that transferring music from compact disc to MP3 for
personal use would be fair use). See also Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant
Technology, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1607 (2009) (discussing the application of the fair use
doctrine to automatic copying, data-processing, and other non-expressive uses).
103
There have been several attempts to organize different fair uses into clusters or
categories, but none of them have discovered or claimed to have discovered a
comprehensive formula to explain or predict all fair use outcomes. See, e.g., Michael J.
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004);
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009).
104
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001).
105
Id.
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work is not important for fair use analysis, and the focus ought to
be on whether there was a change in purpose or character.106
The ascendancy of the transformative use doctrine, and in particular the modified Leval test embraced by the Second Circuit—
whether the secondary work may reasonably be perceived to have
transformed the original in the creation of new information, new
aesthetics, new insights and understandings—that is fast gaining
acceptance in numerous other Circuit Courts, has attracted a fair
share of criticisms.107 Matthew Bunker and Clay Calvert are especially concerned with how the Campbell court had, in a cursory
manner, “turned the transformative use doctrine loose into copyright law, where it quickly became an enormously important, albeit
undertheorized, component in lower court fair-use determinations.”108 They observed that “the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that fair use, along with the separation of facts and ideas from
expression, obviates the need for First Amendment scrutiny of
copyright law by providing an internal statutory safeguard for freespeech interests.”109 They also argued that this “doctrinal murkiness is particularly disturbing because fair use is a key proxy for
free-expression interests in copyright law.”110 Bunker and Calvert
identified three different ways in which courts since Campbell have
conceptualized the transformative use doctrine—transformation as
new insights, creative metamorphosis, and new purpose—and
charged that not only are these multiple models of transformativeness incompatible, but they “create a disturbing First Amendment
106

Id. at 1274 n.27. Samuelson also argues that “makes little sense to organize the fair
use caselaw around [categories]” and that one should focus on the three main underlying
policies of “promoting free speech and expression interests of subsequent authors and the
public, the ongoing progress of authorship, and learning.” Samuelson, supra note 103, at
2544.
107
See, e.g., Thomas Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 701 (2010); Kim J. Landsman, Does Cariou v. Prince Represent the Apogee or
Burn-out of Transformativeness in Fair Use Jurisprudence?, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 321 (2014); Kathleen K. Olson, Transforming Fair Use Online: The
Ninth Circuit’s Productive-Use Analysis of Visual Search Engines, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 153
(2009); Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility,
25 LAW & LITERATURE 20 (2013).
108
Bunker & Calvert, supra note 59, at 94–95.
109
Id. at 95.
110
Id.
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chilling effect.”111 To the contrary, this Article argues that the rising prominence of the transformative use doctrine in copyright law
today represents an inconscient drift into the territory of definitional balancing firmly in favor of First Amendment ideals, and the
preponderance of decisions in recent years—finding transformativeness and fair use in cases involving satire and appropriation
art—are very much protective of expressive interests.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COPYRIGHT
It has been noted by free speech scholar Rodney Smolla that
“[c]ontemporary free speech doctrines are extraordinarily detailed
and often confusing” and that “[m]odern First Amendment law
abounds in three-part and four-part tests of various kinds.”112 Similarly, Lillian BeVier expressed despair at how “First Amendment
theories have multiplied, the case law has become ever more chaotic, and consensus on fundamental issues has remained elusive
both on and off the Court,”113 and Thomas McCarthy pointed out
that the rules are “often maddeningly vague and unpredictable.”114
While it is not the purpose of this Article to propose a systematic
reconciliation or reconstruction of the contentious doctrines and
rules of the First Amendment, this Part argues that an instrumental
understanding of the First Amendment is critical to a more
111

Id. at 126. This categorization is arguably accurate as the courts, in particular the
Second Circuit, have used different formulations for different fact scenarios. Where
appropriation art is concerned, like in Cariou v. Prince and Seltzer v. Green Day, the “new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” test is used. In other
scenarios, for instance where search engines are involved, the courts look for a “different
purpose.” See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015);
Authors Guild, Inc., v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). However, it has also been
argued that behavioral studies suggest that clearer rules can induce even greater chilling
effects. See Edmund T. Wang, The Line Between Copyright and the First Amendment and
Why Its Vagueness May Further Speech Interests, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW. 1471, 1484–98
(2011).
112
RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2:13 (3d ed. 2008); see also Robert C.
Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
2353, 2355 (2000).
113
Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the
Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1280 (2005).
114
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:9 (2d ed.
2015).
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nuanced interpretation of the modified Leval test of transformative
use as presently applied in copyright law.
A. Goals and Theories of the First Amendment
Courts are generally concerned that the enforcement of private
rights, including intellectual property rights, does not have a “chilling effect”115 on free speech. While earlier commentator writings
have identified four separate values served by the First Amendment’s protection of speech,116 more recent scholarship has narrowed the theories for the First Amendment to three distinct yet
interdependent goals: sponsoring enlightenment or the discovery of
truth, self-fulfillment, and citizen participation in a deliberative
democracy.117 There are numerous writings by political philosophers and jurists advocating the protection of free speech principles, but this Article will not be revisiting the arguments by theorists such as John Stuart Mill, Alexander Meiklejohn, Thomas
Emerson, and Ronald Dworkin.118 Instead this Section will focus
115

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); see also ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM
SPEECH 38 (2d ed. 2005); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 80–85 (1982). The term “free speech” shall be taken to mean the freedom of
speech and of the press as protected by the First Amendment. It is well-accepted that “in
modern First Amendment jurisprudence the Press Clause has largely been subsumed into
the Speech Clause.” SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, §§ 22:6, 22:10, 22:18.
116
See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) ((1)
“[A]ssuring individual self-fulfillment”; (2) “[A]dvancing knowledge and discovering
truth”; (3) “[P]rovid[ing] for participation in decisionmaking by all members of society”;
and (4) “[A]chieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community . . .
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.”).
117
Rodney Smolla argues that all three theories should be understood “not as mutually
exclusive defenses of freedom of speech, but rather as mutually supportive rationales.”
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 2:7. See also BARENDT, supra note 115, at 7–21;
MCCARTHY, supra note 114, §§ 8:2–8:8; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN
SOCIETY 14–17 (1992). There have been different variations of the goals advanced by the
First Amendment, but they cover essentially the same themes. See Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
118
For an excellent review of such works, see BARENDT, supra note 115, at 1–36;
SCHAUER, supra note 115, at 35–46. See also RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW
(1996); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (John Gray
ed., 1998).
OF
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only on how the First Amendment is traditionally viewed as essential for the protection of speech from governmental regulation, and
how the courts have determined a hierarchy of different types of
speech with the highest protection accorded to political speech and
a lower level of protection for commercial speech.
1. Discovery of Truth/Marketplace of Ideas
There is a wealth of literature on the truth-seeking function and
the marketplace of ideas, and this Article will not seek to reconcile
differing versions of it, but will only highlight the fundamental tenets and their relevance to copyright law. In its earlier conceptions,
the First Amendment goal of enlightenment or the discovery of
truth is represented most prominently by Oliver Wendell Holmes’
theory of a “marketplace of ideas” expressed most forcefully in
Abrams v. United States:
But when men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution.119
The marketplace theory is perhaps “the most famous and rhetorically resonant of all free speech theories,”120 but it also exhibits
a strong underlying democratic theory, evident in the oft-quoted
phrase from New York Times v. Sullivan that there is a “profound
national commitment” to the principle that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”121 However,
the First Amendment case law offers an important lesson: the Su119

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 2:4.
121
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 318 (1988); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). The
democratic variant of the marketplace of ideas theory was first discussed in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96, 101–12 (1940).
120
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preme Court’s discussion of the relationship between truth, knowledge, and the First Amendment has been inconsistent. The Court
sometimes posits that the discovery of truth within the marketplace
of ideas is a vital justification for the First Amendment. At other
times, however, it subordinates that rationale to other concerns,
such as democratic legitimacy. It is worth noting that the truthseeking justification, and its accompanying marketplace of ideas
metaphor, have become far less influential in contemporary free
speech scholarship, and “the free speech literature appears increasingly to have detached itself from the empirical and instrumental
epistemic arguments made by Mill and others, focusing instead on
the other justifications . . . such as arguments from democracy or
autonomy.”122
This “marketplace” model features most prominently in scenarios where state action is challenged, and is the cornerstone of
the content discrimination doctrine that subjects governmental acts
to judicial strict scrutiny.123 It mandates that speakers should be
free from government control or censorship, so that truth and
falsehood may battle it out in public discourse. In Texas v. Johnson,
the Supreme Court, in the plurality opinion, reiterated that “[i]f
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreea122
Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445,
453 (2012) (referring to Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 897, 909–10 (2010)).
123
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (citing Ashcroft
v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)) (“As a general matter, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech
because of its content will ever be permissible.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
387 (1992) (content discrimination “raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace”). The Supreme Court
has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of or that have the effect of
restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.
On the other hand, so-called “content-neutral” time, place, and manner restrictions are
acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and
do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. See Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1981).
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ble.”124 The value of literature or the arts in the marketplace of
ideas stems from its persuasive or analytic capabilities with respect
to a particular idea or point of view, and the protection of expression is often limited to the audience’s ability to understand or assimilate the underlying idea.125
In terms of its potential relevance to copyright law, the marketplace of ideas doctrine is usually more compatible with protection
of visual expression that privileges political art, but the Supreme
Court in Hurley importantly suggests that no particularized message, let alone a political one, is required for protection. Furthermore, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, an original exponent of the
marketplace theory, remarked, “the people do not need novels or
dramas or paintings or poems, because they will be called upon to
vote.”126
2. Self-fulfillment Function/Individual Autonomy
In contrast, the self-fulfillment function or individual autonomy
rationale shifts the attention from the ideas marketplace to individual dignity.127 While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“the human spirit . . . demands self-expression,”128 there have
been relatively few decisions discussing this as a central goal of the
First Amendment.129 This theory would potentially afford greater
124

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). It is noted that “[e]very idea, no matter
how misguided, and every speaker, no matter how ill-equipped, stands on equal footing.”
Horwitz, supra note 122, at 471.
125
Genevieve Blake, Expressive Merchandise and the First Amendment in Public Fora, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1049, 1059 (2007).
126
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
263; Blake, supra note 125, at 1059.
127
See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 5 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 990–91 (1978); Blake, supra note 125, at 1081–83; David A.J. Richards, Free
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 45, 62 (1974).
128
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974).
129
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969). For a useful discussion of this theory of the First Amendment, see Brian C.
Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998).
There has also been much criticism that individual self-actualization or autonomy cannot
provide a sound basis for the First Amendment. See Patrick M. Garry, The First
Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a Constitutional Model that Focuses on the
Existence of Alternative Channels of Communication, 72 MO. L. REV. 477, 514 (2007);
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First Amendment protection to secondary expressive works that
may reasonably be perceived to have created new information, aesthetics, insights, and understandings because it would eliminate the
need for a particularized analysis of the author’s message, focusing
instead on the function of the expression with regard to the author’s assertion of self in cultural space or other “extrarational value[s].”130 Nevertheless, it has been argued that although this
theory might regard a right to express personal beliefs and political
attitudes as a reflection of what it means to be human, the exercise
of free speech might also be of value to democracy in “leading to
the development of more reflective and mature individuals and so
benefitting society as a whole.”131
3. Participatory Democracy & Distrust of Government
The Supreme Court has more recently embraced a “participatory theory of democracy”132 that is concerned with the enlightenment of public decisionmaking in a democracy through enabling
public access to information and promoting public discourse.133 In
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Chief Justice Roberts,
delivering the plurality opinion, commented:
The First Amendment “is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the
arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of
each of us, . . . in the belief that no other approach
Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19 (1990).
130
Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 110 (1996); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 604 (1982).
131
Tom Campbell, Rationales for Freedom of Communication, in FREEDOM OF
COMMUNICATION 33–34 (Tom Campbell & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 1994); see also
BARENDT, supra note 115, at 13.
132
See Post, supra note 112, at 2371; see also BARENDT, supra note 115, at 18–21;
DWORKIN, supra note 118, at 15–26. Smolla refers to this as the “democratic selfgovernance” rationale. SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 2:28.
133
See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53
(1988); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976);
see also King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005); Prometheus
Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Rowlee, 899
F.2d 1275, 1278 (2d Cir. 1990).
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would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests.” . . . . [It] safeguards an individual’s right to
participate in the public debate . . . .134
This theory of participatory democracy has been viewed as
drawing on elements of the other two theories: that the minorities
in a representative democracy have the right to contribute to political debate as they may have better ideas than the majority, and that
the right of individuals to dignity and self-fulfillment may be expressed through their engagement in public discourse. It has also
been called the “most important theoretical approach to freedom
of speech in the twentieth century.”135 Often known as the Madisonian ideal of deliberative democracy, different but related versions of this theory have been prominently championed by constitutional scholars like Robert Post,136 Cass Sunstein,137 and Jack Balkin.138 Post believes that democratic self-government is the primary
end of the First Amendment, arguing “[i]t is plain that within public discourse the value of democratic legitimation enjoys lexical
priority.”139

134

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (quoting
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24).
135
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2004).
136
See Post, supra note 112; Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy
and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993); Robert C. Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990) [hereinafter Post,
Constitutional Concept].
137
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17–23, 241–
52 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 6–9, 96–101, 239–43 (2001).
138
Balkin argues that the purpose of free speech is to promote a “democratic culture”
that is even broader than deliberation about public issues such that each individual has “a
fair chance to participate in the production of culture, and in the development of the ideas
and meanings that constitute them and the communities and subcommunities to which
they belong.” Balkin, supra note 135, at 4; see also Jack M. Balkin, Populism and
Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1948–49 (1995).
139
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 34 (2012).
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The participatory theory is also supported by the more philosophical writings of Meiklejohn,140 Dworkin,141 and Owen Fiss.142
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled that to qualify for the
highest levels of constitutional protection speech must relate to
self-government,143 Justice Stephen Breyer, speaking in an extrajudicial capacity, has advocated an approach to constitutional adjudication centred on “active liberty” similar to Post’s participatory
theory.144 An acceptance of the participatory theory has important
implications for the continuing development of the transformative
use doctrine in resolving the tension between free speech values
and property rights when arguing fair use in a copyright infringement claim as it focuses on not an abstract notion of the quest for
truth, but on how the nature and content of communication can
“ensure that the individual can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government”145 where “national identity [is understood] to be endlessly controversial.”146
This democratic rationale of the First Amendment is usually intertwined with a deep distrust of government. In United States v.
Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts commented, “[t]he First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.
Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment
simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”147 Similarly,
in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, Justice Scalia emphasized that “esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for the Government to
140

See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS

OF THE PEOPLE 19–28 (1965).
141

See DWORKIN, supra note 118, at 15–26.
See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409–10
(1986).
143
Garry, supra note 129, at 519; see also SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 2:46.
144
Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2002).
The participatory theory also appears to have the support of Brian Murchison who,
through an analysis of judgments of the Supreme Court, contends that the “selfgovernance value” underpins the First Amendment. See Brian C. Murchison, Speech and
the Self-Governance Value, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1251, 1291 (2006).
145
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
146
Post, supra note 112, at 2369; see also BARENDT, supra note 115, at 48–49.
147
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
142
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decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”148 The
Supreme Court has never made an “official choice” among competing theories.149 But “where the doctrinal implications of different prominent theories . . . collide, courts will tend to give priority
to the participatory theory of democracy.”150 The implication is
that an infringing work that contains some form of political speech
that advances democratic debate should warrant heightened First
Amendment protection, and this status should be acknowledged
when evaluating the fair use defense.
B. Infringing Works Can Also Be Expressive Works
While this Section does not cover all the different kinds of
transformative uses, it will attempt to show that in at least three
categories of transformative uses—(1) to (3) as identified in Part
I—First Amendment considerations are important in guiding the
evaluation of transformative use to ensure that the end-result advances not only the goals of the Copyright Clause, but also those of
the Free Speech Clause.151 Such uses tend to comment on or
present a different way of viewing familiar iconography, societal
archetypes, public obsessions, and majoritarian beliefs, and, as
such, they fall within the First Amendment categories of protected
speech, such as political speech, art, entertainment, and matters of
public interest.
148

Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011); see also Playboy
Entm’t Grp, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
149
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (1996).
150
Post, supra note 112, at 2371; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a
Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 577–78 (1999). According to Frederick
Schauer, the “narrowness of the argument from democracy is also its greatest
strength . . . it does furnish several strong reasons for giving special attention and
protection to political speech.” SCHAUER, supra note 115, at 44. It is noted that the
opposition to the participatory theory comes most strongly from those who argue from a
position of individual autonomy. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty and Free Speech, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997); David Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy and Freedom of
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354–55 (1991).
151
It should be noted that Rebecca Tushnet has previously presented a complementary
analysis of how copying often has substantial speech value, and how pervasive copying
may be necessary to convey a persuasive message or to participate in a group’s activities.
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and Copying
Saves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
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A parody must invoke or copy a significant proportion of the
original copyrighted work in order for the parody to be effective; it
will invariably satisfy the substantial similarity test for copyright
infringement. The question that follows is whether the parody can
nevertheless claim to be fair use. Parody enjoys an exalted protected status in intellectual property jurisprudence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals described parody as “a humorous form of
social commentary and literary criticism . . . [that] seeks to ridicule
sacred verities and prevailing mores,”152 thus implicating First
Amendment concerns. The Second Circuit noted “the broad scope
permitted parody in First Amendment Law,”153 and that “in today’s world of unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of parody.”154 In a more rigorous examination
of the First Amendment’s influence on the fair use defense, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has more overtly considered the
status of parody under the Free Speech Clause in Mattel v. Walking
Mountain Productions.155 The court was of the view that parody has
“socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment.”156 More importantly, the court ruled that while individuals
may disagree on the success or extent of a parody, parodic elements that may “reasonably be perceived” in a work will often justify fair use protection.157 Parody may thus be seen as contributing
valuable commentary and criticism to the marketplace of ideas, or
advancing democratic debate on matters of public interest through
the use of irreverent humor.
In Campbell, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of
protecting parody as fair use, but did not explicitly refer to the First
Amendment. Justice Souter merely asserted that “parody has an
obvious claim to transformative value.”158 In Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, where Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine alleging that
the publisher had intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him
152

L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987).
Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982).
154
Elsmere Music v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980).
155
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003).
156
Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400
(9th Cir. 1997)).
157
Id.
158
Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
153
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through a parody advertisement depicting him as drunk, immoral,
and hypocritical, the Supreme Court reiterated that:
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. “[T]he freedom to speak one’s
mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and
thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as
a whole.”159
Although the case concerned offensive political cartoons and
vulgar caricatures of public figures, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concerns about stifling political discourse comports with prevailing
judicial sentiments about the importance of parody (defined broadly).160
While the critical message in a parody that comments directly
on the original work or its author can be easily discerned, the ideas
expressed in other forms of artistic works may be more obtuse. The
famous comment by the Supreme Court in Hurley that “a narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection”161 appears to have been implicitly subsumed within the
modified Leval test—whether the secondary work may reasonably be
perceived to have transformed the original in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—that presently holds sway over the Second and Ninth Circuits. This broader approach to transformative use allows for uses of the original
work that do not comment on the original or may not even have a
critical bearing on the original, so long as the original has been used
in the creation of something new. From the perspective of the First
Amendment, this new creation inevitably adds to the marketplace
of ideas, and certain situations can stimulate political discourse or
discussion of public issues. The protection of speech—which gen-

159

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1987) (quoting Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984)).
160
Id. at 51–55.
161
Hurley v. Irish-Am., Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
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erally includes symbolic or expressive conduct162—by the First
Amendment depends on its position in a hierarchy of protectable
speech, the applicable level of scrutiny of the governmental action,
and the nature of the other rights it is in conflict with.163 However,
the Supreme Court has not established “a clear theory to explain
why and when speech qualifies for the top tier,”164 with the plurality opinion in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders conceding that
the inquiry “must be determined by [the expression’s] content,
form and context.”165 In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, Justice Scalia, delivering the majority judgment, emphasized:
The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect
discourse on public matters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from
entertainment, and dangerous to try. “Everyone is
familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”166
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, Justice Souter
commented that the “constitutional protection of artistic works
turns not on the political significance that may be attributable to
such productions, though they may indeed comment on the political, but simply on their expressive character, which falls within a
spectrum of protected ‘speech’ extending outward from the core
of overtly political declarations.”167 From the First Amendment
perspective, art has the potential to “affect public attitudes and
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”168 Hence, when appropriation art
162

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (cross-burning); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1989) (flag-burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (wearing black armbands); Ayres v. City of Chicago,
125 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997) (wearing t-shirts).
163
BARENDT, supra note 115, at 75; see also SCHAUER, supra note 115, at 89–92; William
Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982).
164
SUNSTEIN, PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 137, at 11.
165
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
166
Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
167
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602–03 (1998).
168
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
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is found to infringe the copyright in an original antecedent work
that is used as a referential device, there is a clash of two sets of
expressive interests. The attempt to resolve this conflict through a
simplistic invocation of the transformative use doctrine in the fair
use defense—as evident in Blanch v. Koons and Cariou v. Prince—
sidesteps the important First Amendment considerations of
whether the secondary artistic use espouses a particular political
viewpoint or a different social shaping of thought that would allow
it to trump the right of the original author.
Appropriation art, as a genre of contemporary art, is often an
ideological critique that takes or hijacks “dominant words and images to create insubordinate, counter messages.”169 Appropriation
art has been defined as “[t]he practice or technique of reworking
the images or styles contained in earlier works of art, esp[ecially]
(in later use) in order to provoke critical re-evaluation of wellknown pieces by presenting them in new contexts, or to challenge
notions of individual creativity or authenticity in art.”170 It is identified closely with the practice of “recoding” or “a shift in meaning” which occurs purely due to the fact that an original word, image, or object has been appropriated.171 The Second Circuit recognized the genre of appropriation art as a “tradition [which] defines
its efforts as follows: when the artist finishes his work, the meaning
of the original object has been extracted and an entirely new meaning set in its place. An example is Andy Warhol’s reproduction of
multiple images of Campbell’s soup cans.”172
In Rogers v. Koons (“Koons I”), although the Second Circuit
thought that Jeff Koons’ earlier work of a stainless steel casting of
an inflatable rabbit holding a carrot belonged to this genre,173 it
found Koons’ sculpture, String of Puppies, which was based on Art
Rogers’ photograph, Puppies, displayed at an art gallery, to be in169

David Evans, Introduction: Seven Types of Appropriation, in APPROPRIATION 12, 13
(2009); see also E. Kenly Ames, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for
Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473 (1993).
170
Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 220 (2007).
171
Isabelle Graw, Fascination, Subversion and Dispossession in Appropriation Art, in
APPROPRIATION, supra note 169, at 214.
172
Koons I, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
173
Id.
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sufficiently transformative and hence infringing the copyright in
the original photograph Puppies on which the sculpture was based.
True to the tradition of appropriation art, there must exist a significant degree of exact reproduction of the original object (i.e, Warhol’s reverential treatment of the Campbell’s soup cans) in order
for the artist to convey his or her comment or criticism of a particular cultural or social phenomenon. It may be just a subtle shift in
context, medium, motif or style which delivers that postmodern
critique. In Koons I, it is arguable that Koons did just that. He
wanted every feature of the photograph by Art Rogers of a typical
American scene—a smiling husband and wife holding a litter of
eight charming puppies—copied faithfully in the sculpture.174 The
minutiae of Koons’ craft itself is a critical commentary of the meticulous obsession of the media with, and the general interest of the
public in, banality. The court accepted Koons’ argument that he
had drawn upon “the artistic movements of Cubism and Dadaism,
with particular influence attributed to Marcel Duchamp, who in
1913 became the first to incorporate manufactured objects (readymades) into a work of art, directly influencing Koons’ work and the
work of other contemporary American artists.”175 The court also
agreed that Koons:
[B]elongs to the school of American artists who believe the mass production of commodities and media images has caused a deterioration in the quality
of society, and this artistic tradition of which he is a
member proposes through incorporating these images into works of art to comment critically both on
the incorporated object and the political and economic system that created it.176
But the Second Circuit’s issue with Koons was that he failed to
comment critically on the original photograph that was incorporated into his work. Decided before the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision on fair use in Campbell in 1994, the court in Koons I found
174

Id. at 305, 307; see also Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 CIV. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993) (holding that Jeff Koons’ sculpture “Ushering in Banality,”
based on Barbara Campbell’s photograph “Boys with Pig,” was not a fair use).
175
Koons I, 960 F.2d at 311.
176
Id.
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against Koons, noting that “even given that String of Puppies is a
satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to discern
any parody of the photograph Puppies itself.”177
However, post-Campbell, and fourteen years after Koons I was
handed down, Jeff Koons was back before the Second Circuit
again, but this time, the result was in his favor, despite the absence
of parody. In Koons II, the court demonstrated a greater willingness
to embrace appropriation art and its postmodernist technique of
recontextualizing or repurposing objects and images in mainstream
media or familiar to the public at large. The decision resonates with
the Supreme Court’s willingness to protect artistic expression as
demonstrated in Hurley and Finley, where the First Amendment
was explicitly considered. Koons’ use of Andrea Blanch’s photograph Silk Sandals by Gucci published in a fashion magazine for his
collage Niagara—one of the artworks in the Easyfun-Ethereal series
exhibited at the Deutsche Guggenheim Berlin—was held to be
transformative.178 Koons did not intend to parody or comment on
the original Blanch photograph; but he claimed that he created the
painting to “comment on the ways in which some of our most basic
appetites—for food, play and sex—are mediated by popular images.”179 He also intended to “compel the viewer to break out of
the conventional way of experiencing a particular appetite as mediated by mass media,”180 and he used Blanch’s photograph because it represented “a particular type of woman frequently presented in advertising” and that this typicality “further[ed] his purpose of commenting on the commercial images . . . in our consumer
culture.”181 The Second Circuit applied the modified Leval test
and found sufficient transformation to qualify Koons for the fair
use defense.
177

Id. Relying on Koons I, the New York district court also found against Koons when
United Feature Syndicate sued Koons for copyright infringement in his sculptural work
“Wild Boy and Puppy” that featured the Odie cartoon dog character from the Garfield
series. Judge Leisure did not even attempt to examine issues of parody, satire, or critical
commentary, but simply cited Koons I as authority that the $125,000 sculptures were
nothing but “high-priced art.” United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp.
370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
178
Koons II, 467 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 248 (internal citations omitted).
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After Koons II, it is arguable that courts should focus instead on
examining the appropriation artist’s “justification for the very act
of borrowing”182 and the artist’s explanation of how “the use of an
existing image advanced his artistic purposes.”183 This line of inquiry is very much aligned with the First Amendment ethos of
promoting self-actualization and advancing the marketplace of
ideas; it treats the secondary work not just as aesthetic art but also
as critical commentary on matters of public concern.184
In Cariou v. Prince, there is much similarity between Richard
Prince’s and Koons’ intent in reproducing original photographs in
order to successfully convey new meanings through repurposing
preexisting works. The Second Circuit’s focus on “artistic purpose” is consistent with the line of Supreme Court decisions that
has affirmed that the First Amendment’s protection extends even
to artistic expression that does not convey a “particularized message.”185 Robert Kausnic hints at this postmodern turn in copyright
law:
Koons expressed the purpose of allowing the viewer
to create the meaning from his or her own “personal
experience with these objects, products, and images
and at the same time gain new [and unspecified] insight into how these affect our lives.” In a sense,
Koons carefully refused to infuse particular meaning
to the work, but rather empowered the viewer with
establishing his or her own relative meaning.186
Similarly, Peter Jaszi suggests that Koons II “may signal a general loosening of authors’ and owners’ authority over, by now, not
quite so auratic works, allowing greater space for the free play of
meaning on the part of audience members and follow-up users who
182

Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994); Koons II, 467 F.3d at 255.
Koons II, 467 F.3d at 255. The court also cautioned that “Koons’s clear conception
of his reasons for using ‘Silk Sandals,’ and his ability to articulate those reasons, ease our
analysis in this case. We do not mean to suggest, however, that either is a sine qua non for
a finding of fair use—as to satire or more generally.” Id. at 255 n.5.
184
See Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2015).
185
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
186
Robert Kausnic, The Problem of Meaning in Non-Discursive Expression, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 399, 421 (2010).
183
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bring new interpretations.”187 This kind of art—typical of the oeuvre of contemporary artists like Warhol, Koons, and Prince—has
been termed “nonpropositional art” because it conveys “no single
representation or message.”188 Randall Bezanson contends that
such art yields “a message or meaning that is the creation not of
the artist’s propositional intention but the viewer’s independent
construction.”189 Referring to Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Cans and
Prince’s Cowboys series, Benzanson argues that “their ‘message’ is
their value as an instrument that unleashes the viewer’s own, perhaps idiosyncratic, leap of imagination and perception.”190 But
more importantly, even a visually non-transformative work may be
contextually transformative because it has introduced new ideas
fundamentally different from the original. Referring to Sherrie Levine’s rephotographing of Walker Evans’ photographs in her series
titled After Walker Evans, Emily Meyers argues that “[i]n this regard, authorship is tantamount, for it infuses the appropriated or
derivative work with vastly different significance. A derivative or
appropriating use in this regard will never substitute for the original.”191 Levine’s attempt has been lauded by art critics:
Levine’s re-presentation of the Evans works as her
own is an astute artistic strategy that questions not
only the power relations inscribed in the action of
the “master” photographer Evans but also the subsequent art-historical canonization and market value
of the original works. Property relations, patriarchal
authority, authorship and originality are all brought
under scrutiny.192
Although the original image by Evans and the second by Levine
may be indistinguishable from one another, “[t]he roles each plays
in the history of art continuum are unique.”193 Evans’ image clearly
187

Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 105, 116 (2009).
188
RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 280 (2009).
189
Id. at 280.
190
Id. at 285.
191
Meyers, supra note 170, at 239.
192
Polly Staple, Switzerland, FRIEZE MAG. (June–Aug. 2008), http://www.frieze.com/
issue/article/switzerland/ [http://perma.cc/F8CG-Z74F].
193
Meyers, supra note 170, at 239.
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has a different purpose and character from Levine’s.194 Indeed,
“[w]hether the creator of a transformative work is an unsuccessful
artist on a shoestring budget like Forsythe or a hugely successful
public figure with funding from Deustche Bank and the Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation like Koons, fair use allows artists to further the generation of new meaning through repurposing preexisting works.”195 One does not need to like what Richard Prince does,
but it is quintessential not only to the progress of the arts196 but also
to the marketplace of ideas that one has the opportunity to learn
about and discuss the diversity of styles and perspectives. Guggenheim art curator Nancy Spector commented, “Prince’s appropriations of existing photographs are never merely copies of the already
available. Instead, they extract a kind of photographic unconsciousness form the image, bringing to the fore suppressed truths
about its meaning and its making.”197
III.

REDISCOVERING THE LOST FIRST AMENDMENT
WITHIN TRANSFORMATIVE USE

A. Copyright and the Issue of Its First Amendment Immunity
Copyright law as enshrined in the Copyright Act is viewpoint
neutral and generally applies on its face to all individuals and firms
regardless of their identity and ideology, and regardless of the content of the speech. While the copyright statute does not target the
use of another’s copyrighted work to advocate or oppose war, gay
marriage, abortion rights, drug use, pornography, gun control, and
governmental policies, it clearly abridges speech through the imposition of civil liability for an unauthorized use of a work protected
under copyright law.
194

Art historians have highlighted “the political and feminist underpinnings of the
exclusively masculine works by seminal male artists Levine chose to appropriate.”
Meyers, supra note 170, at 224; see also Sherrie Levine, After Walker Evans 2 (1981),
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/1995.266.2
[http://perma.cc/R25YEVMH].
195
Matt Williams, Silence and Postmodern Copyright, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47,
70 (2011).
196
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
197
NANCY SPECTOR, RICHARD PRINCE 26 (2007).
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The Supreme Court has highlighted that while freedom of
speech has been recognized “as indispensable to a free society and
its government . . . [it] has not meant that the public interest in free
speech . . . always has prevailed over competing interests of the
public.”198 Most existing First Amendment jurisprudence is concerned with governmental action that abridges speech,199 with less
attention given to discussing how private action can also significantly restrict speech.200 In the area of intellectual property, particularly copyright and trademark laws, instead of subjecting the
relevant legislation to an intermediate scrutiny analysis, courts
have traditionally preferred to “accommodate” First Amendment
interests within existing intellectual property doctrine. For example, the twin rulings of the Supreme Court in Eldred and Golan
have steadfastly refused to consider separate First Amendment arguments outside the internal structures of copyright law, namely
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.201 In trademark law,
courts have denied First Amendment protections to advertisers
who violate section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, reasoning that such
198

Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979). Regarding the protection of
private property as a competing interest, see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 82–88 (1980) and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569–70 (1972).
199
The Supreme Court has employed a “heightened scrutiny methodology” drawn
from the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence where governmental regulation has to
satisfy the relevant strict, intermediate, or rational scrutiny standards, depending on
whether it was content-neutral or content-based. Content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions are usually permitted if they serve a substantial governmental
interest, but content-based restriction of protectable speech will be subject to strict
scrutiny, which is usually fatal to the challenged regulation. See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra
note 112, §§ 2:12, 3:1–3:2; see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S.
803, 817 (2000); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874–79 (1997); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981); Susan Williams, Content Discrimination and the
First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991).
200
On the impact of the enforcement of private intellectual property rights on the public
domain, see generally, Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private
Intellectual Property and the Public Domain Part II, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191
(1994); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127 (1993).
201
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
219 (2003). Rebecca Tushnet has criticized this approach, see supra note 151, at 590
(“Denied a presence in the main body of copyright law, the First Amendment returns as
fair use. This back-door approach has several troublesome effects.”).
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laws pose no constitutional problems because they regulate only
false and misleading commercial speech; the likelihood of confusion test and the artistic relevance defense readily shield expressive
uses like parody from liability.202 Even for trademark dilution
claims, the First Amendment operates through broadly crafted statutory defenses like the non-commercial exception and the parody
defense.203
According to Melville Nimmer, courts applying the method of
“definitional balancing” weigh the objectives and policy considerations that underlie the speech-burdening legal doctrine against
those that underlie the First Amendment in order to set out generally applicable definitional rules governing which forms of speech
the legal doctrine in question may constitutionally burden and
which it may not.204 Although courts today are employing the content-based/content-neutral distinction—with the consequent application of a strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny standard—
when evaluating government action that abridges the freedom of

202

See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 263
(4th Cir. 2007) (holding that “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys is an obvious parody of “Louis
Vuitton” handbags and on balance, does not cause confusion); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420
F.3d 309, 314–15 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that the “likelihood-of-confusion test [for
trademark infringement] generally strikes a comfortable balance between the First
Amendment and the rights of [trade]mark holders” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that the
likelihood of confusion test generally strikes a comfortable balance between the trademark
owner’s property rights and First Amendment interests); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (prohibiting application of the Lanham Act to titles of artistic
works unless the title “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever or, if it
has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the
content of the work”); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486–
87 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding the use of “Lardashe” jeans for larger women to be a
successful and permissible parody of “Jordache” jeans); L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishers,
Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (“It offends the Constitution, however, to invoke the
anti-dilution statute as a basis for enjoining the noncommercial use of a trademark by a
defendant engaged in a protected form of expression”).
203
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); see also Bosley Med.
Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677–80 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s
use of a trademark in the name and content of its website to criticize the trademark holder
is a noncommercial use protected by the First Amendment).
204
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1184–93 (1970).
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speech,205 there remain important areas of private causes of action
where this definitional balancing is applied. Examples of this definitional balancing are evident in the “actual malice” rule in the laws
of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress206 and
the definition of “obscenity” in exclusionary categories of speech
falling fully outside the protection of the First Amendment.207
Nimmer has argued previously that copyright law already contains
a de facto definitional balance, located in the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.208
Although the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Eldred
commented that not all copyright laws are “categorically immune”
from First Amendment challenges,209 the essential thrust of Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion is that “[as long as] Congress has not altered
the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”210 In Golan, Justice Ginsburg again delivered the opinion of the Court and reaffirmed the
holding in Eldred, noting that “some restriction on expression is
the inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright,”211 but
there was no necessity for heightened scrutiny if Congress has not
interfered with the built-in First Amendment accommodations—
mainly the idea/expression distinction and fair use defense—
embraced by copyright law.212 David Lange and Jefferson Powell
argue that what Justice Ginsburg and the majority see as speechprotective safeguards “make no sense as a justification for infringement of free expression under the First Amendment.”213 As
205

See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231 (2012);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth
Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273 (2009); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the
First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991).
206
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
207
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
208
Nimmer, supra note 204, at 1189–93; Netanel, supra note 18, at 1085–86.
209
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
210
Id. For a detailed criticism of the opinion, see DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST
AMENDMENT 114–24 (2009).
211
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
212
Id. at 890–91.
213
LANGE & POWELL, supra note 210, at 123.
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it stands today, “copyright law inverts the ordinary presumptions
of First Amendment analysis . . . . In the world of Eldred, it is the
intrusion of the First Amendment into a vast regulatory scheme
against which the Court must be on guard, not the government’s
invasion of the domain of free expression.”214
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg’s passing comment that “fair use
defense affords considerable latitude for scholarship and comment, . . . even for parody”215 suggests rather flippantly that the
much revered First Amendment merits even no further internal
examination when it clashes with copyright. Is the fair use defense
sufficiently robust to accommodate the different speech-protective
rationales of, and the different hierarchies of, speech recognized by
the First Amendment? The deafening silence of any reference to
the First Amendment is startling in judicial fair use analysis, especially when the transformative use doctrine provides the most appropriate entry point for discussing whether recognizing an infringing use as “transformative”—and ultimately fair—properly balances the goals of copyright as an “engine of free expression” and
“to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for
their labors.”216
Lange and Powell lament over “intellectual property’s increasing dominance over expression”217 and disparagingly point out that
“it is copyright against the First Amendment in a game the First
Amendment is slated to lose.”218 This Article disagrees with such
an apocalyptic view of the influence of the First Amendment on
intellectual property laws, and argues, to the contrary, that the spirit of the First Amendment has in fact been guiding the rise of the
transformative use doctrine in the copyright fair use defense. In
order to better understand the covert operation of the First
Amendment within the strictures of copyright law—as well as in
trademark law—one must first appreciate how copyrighted works,
like trademarks, can function as semiotic signs which are encoded
214

Id. at 123.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003)).
216
Id. at 890 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985)).
217
LANGE & POWELL, supra note 210, at 124.
218
Id. at 123.
215
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with specific meanings or viewpoints either ascribed to them by the
original author or by the public.
When an infringer uses these copyrighted works to express a
different viewpoint, or to comment or criticize the original work or
the author, such a use, in copyright parlance, may signify a change
in purpose or character of the original work.219 Alternatively, in the
words of Leval, the original work has been “transformed in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”220 If one were to deconstruct this doctrine through
the lens of the First Amendment, the transformative use test clearly advances the marketplace of ideas and the democratic rationale
through the creation of “new information” and “new insights and
understandings,” as well as the self-fulfillment function through
the creation of “new aesthetics.”221 In view of the contemporary
cultural significance of many well-known copyrighted works, this
Article urges a consideration of copyrighted works as semiotic
signs in order to comprehend how courts have already embarked
on a covert First Amendment rescue to ensure that copyright accommodates itself to the freedom of speech rather than the reverse.
B. The “Work” as a Semiotic Sign
Copyright law is often premised on the identification of an author of a literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work, and then giving this author monopoly rights for a limited period to control the
commercial exploitation of his or her intellectual creation. However, the hegemonic position of the authorial text has been challenged
by scholars like Roland Barthes, who argues that “a text’s unity lies
not in its origin but in its destination” and that “the birth of the
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”222 Barthes’
work, controversial at the time of publication with its assault on
219

See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Leval, supra note 28, at 1111.
221
See Tushnet, supra note 151, at 558 (“[T]ransformative uses fit comfortably in an
older, constitutionalized discourse about criticism, contrarianism, protest, offensiveness,
and unpopularity . . . transformative use can easily borrow from First Amendment
theories to bolster its economic argument.”).
222
Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142, 148 (Stephen
Heath trans. 1977).
220
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modernity and the primacy of authorial control, has nonetheless
laid the groundwork for an important body of scholarship on interpretive communities. Interdisciplinary legal writings, especially in
the area of intellectual property and personality rights, have also
actively engaged such themes in recent years.223 For example, Nathaniel Noda contends that copyright law ought to “keep pace with
changing times and practices by recognizing that an author implicitly cedes certain interpretive rights to the general public when he
or she introduces a work into the stream of public discourse.”224
Contemporary cultural studies are concerned with the practices
of popular culture, the relationships between audiences and producers, the formation of identity, and the nature of consumption.
In particular, the application of semiotics to assist the development
of intellectual property laws relating to logos, images, and literary
works has received significant scholarly attention. For example,
Barton Beebe, in his seminal works on a semiotic account of trademark doctrine,225 has persuasively demonstrated that “semiotic
concepts can be applied to clarify and ameliorate fundamental areas
of trademark doctrine and policy.”226 His analysis of “sign value”
as a “Saussurean structural value” that involves a “conspicuous
display of distinctions, of ‘marginal differences’”227 has a parallel
relevance to well-known literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic
works. I have also investigated the influence of semiotics on the
laws relating to famous marks, and the commercial appropriation of
the celebrity personality in the right of publicity.228
223

See Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests,
77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of
Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997).
224
Nathaniel T. Noda, Copyright Retold: How Interpretive Rights Foster Creativity and
Justify Fan-Based Activities, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 987, 991 (2010).
225
See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Account of Trademark Doctrine and Trademark
Culture, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH
42 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) [hereinafter Beebe, Semiotic
Account]; Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621
(2004).
226
Beebe, Semiotic Account, supra note 225, at 42.
227
Id. at 62.
228
David Tan, The Semiotics of Alpha Brands: Encoding/Decoding/Recoding/Transcoding
of Louis Vuitton and Implications for Trademark Laws, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 221
(2013) [hereinafter Tan, Semiotics of Alpha Brands]; David Tan, Political Recoding of the
Contemporary Celebrity and the First Amendment, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1 (2011)
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Umberto Eco describes semiotics as a social science discipline
that studies “everything that can be taken as a sign.”229 A sign is
simply a thing that stands for something else. Although it has its
origins in the study of language, semiotic analysis is a translinguistic activity230 that can be applied to the inquiry of “[a system] of structural codes . . . that engages with culture, consumption, and communication in the marketplace.”231 The Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure is widely credited as the most influential scholar in the field of semiotics. He emphasized the nature of
the sign as the coded association of a material signifier, such as the
sound of a word, with a signified or preconceived meaning.232 In his
oft-cited work on the semiotic analyses of consumer cultures, Mythologies, Roland Barthes explains that “any semiology postulates a
relation between two terms, a signifier and a signified”233 and that a
sign “is the associative total of the first two terms.”234 A wellknown literary or artistic work does much more than simply educate, inform, or entertain, but it also functions as a signifier of a set
of signified meanings. While there is much debate over the extent of
copyright protection given to fictional literary characters outside of
the context of the works in which they appear, cartoon characters
in meticulously drawn comic books usually have no problem being
categorized as pictorial or graphic works235 that fall within “the
core of the copyright’s protective purposes.”236 Mickey Mouse,
Barbie, Captain America, and Superman are just some of the iconic
characters from the last century that are universally recognized today; each is emblematic of a unique set of character values and semiotic significance and has become a “common [point] of refer[hereinafter Tan, Political Recoding]; David Tan, Affective Transfer & the Appropriation of
Commercial Value: A Cultural Analysis of the Right of Publicity, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
272 (2010).
229
UMBERTO ECO, THE THEORY OF SIGNS 7 (1979).
230
ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY 11 (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith
trans., 2000) (1964).
231
LAURA R. OSWALD, MARKETING SEMIOTICS: SIGNS, STRATEGIES, AND BRAND
VALUES 47 (2012).
232
See generally FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, THE COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Roy
Harris trans., 1983) (1916).
233
BARTHES, supra note 20, at 111.
234
Id.
235
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012).
236
Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
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ence for millions of individuals who may never interact with one
another, but who share, by virtue of their participation in a mediated culture [as the audience], a common experience and a collective memory.”237 The representative fictional characters from
the works—for example, Mickey Mouse, Snow White, and Sleeping Beauty from the canonical universe of Disney’s works—may
function as signifiers of both individualized and a shared set of
meanings. A “myth” is thereby created when meaning within a
semiological system is transformed into form as represented by a
sign;238 each sign becomes naturally associated with a set of meanings or “historical intention”239 which is ultimately consumed.
Like famous trademarks, the copyrighted character signifier/signified relationship would have become universally codified
for the audience; the audience will automatically and consistently
think of the coded meanings and values (the signified) when they
are exposed to the character signifiers. In other words, the fictional
character becomes a sign for a predetermined set of cultural codes
and audience experiences associated with the work or the author of
the work.240 It has been noted:
If anyone who wanted to could appropriate a cultural object, transform it according to her own whims,
and rerelease it into society, the result could be a
win-win scenario for First Amendment values: significantly improved personal autonomy combined
with democracy-reinforcing political expression . . . .
....
. . . More fundamentally, the loss of radical
voices and ideas hurts the marketplace of ideas and
the First Amendment maxim “that everything
worth saying shall be said.”241

237

JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY

IN THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 163 (1990).

238
239

240
241

Id. at 131.
Id. at 142.
See Tan, Semiotics of Alpha Brands, supra note 228, at 227.
Note, supra note 21, at 1497–99 (internal citations omitted).
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Referring to Barthes’ work on modern myths,242 as well as to
Antonio Gramsci243 and Claude Lévi-Strauss,244 Stuart Hall discusses the politics of signification245 and how ideological discourses
of a particular society are classified and framed through semiotic
signs.246 Like Barthesian myths, cartoon characters such as Mickey
Mouse and Snow White, well-known superhero characters such as
Superman, Captain America, and Wonder Woman, as well as fictional characters from popular television series like Star Trek, all
contain subject positions and models for identification that are
heavily coded ideologically. These iconic copyrighted works can
have an ideological function of not only reiterating dominant values, but also concealing prevalent contradictions or social problems. More generally, it has been said that “identities can function
as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’ abjected.”247 In
particular, Eleanor Byrne and Martin McQuillan argued that the
“Disney [text] has become synonymous with a certain conservative, patriarchal, heterosexual ideology which is loosely associated
with American cultural imperialism.”248 The canon of Disney films
has been said to “open themselves onto the entire history of the
West and act as a symptomatic concentration of all the ideological

242

BARTHES, supra note 20, at 50.
ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quintin Hoare &
Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans., 1971).
244
CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (James Harle
Bell & John Richard von Sturmer trans., 1969); CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE SCOPE OF
ANTHROPOLOGY (Sherry Ortner Paul & Robert A. Paul trans., 1967).
245
See Stuart Hall, The Rediscovery of “Ideology”: Return of the Repressed in Media
Studies, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 56, 64–74 (Michael Gurevitch et al. eds.,
1982).
246
Id. at 74; see also Tan, supra note 99, at 94.
247
Stuart Hall, Introduction: Who Needs “Identity”?, in QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL
IDENTITY 1, 5 (Stuart Hall & Paul Du Gay eds., 1996); see also JUDITH P. BUTLER, BODIES
THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX (1993); ERNESTO LACLAU, NEW
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME (1990); Stuart Hall, The Local and the
Global: Globalization and Ethnicity, in CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WORLD
SYSTEM: CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF IDENTITY 19
(Anthony D. King ed., 1997).
248
ELEANOR BYRNE & MARTIN MCQUILLAN, DECONSTRUCTING DISNEY 1–2 (1999); see
also HENRY A. GIROUX, THE MOUSE THAT ROARED: DISNEY AND THE END OF INNOCENCE
30–32 (1999).
243
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contests which are currently being fought in our world today.”249
Indeed many of Disney’s texts present fertile opportunities for opposite or subversive readings that disrupt the hegemony of a hyperrealist utopian escapism. In terms of recoding, scholars like John
Fiske have emphasized the potential of audience reconstruction of
dominant symbols of a culture. Fiske coined the term “semiotic
democracy” to describe a world where empowered audiences freely and widely engage in the use of cultural symbols to express
meanings that are different from the ones intended by their creators.250 Sarah Trombley had also expressed concerns about why, in
order to be able to speak effectively, one needs to be able to appropriate and transform the work of others:
In the United States, more and more powerful,
widely-recognized symbols and icons have become
private property even as corporations invest billions
of dollars in ensuring that they saturate public discourse. We are in danger of creating an impoverished “look, but don’t touch” world, one in which
the very public whose enthusiastic response to certain symbols and icons gives them their resonance
cannot use those symbols and icons themselves to
communicate—a sad inversion of the copyright regime’s original goal of enriching the stock of American culture.251
The writings of Rosemary Coombe252 and Michael Warner253
on subaltern groups and counterpublics have approached the constitution and politics of social and individual identity as being predicated on a power struggle between dominant and subordinate
groups. The terms “subaltern” or “subculture” are frequently
249

BYRNE & MCQUILLAN, supra note 248, at 168.
JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 239 (1987); see also Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic
Disobedience, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2006); Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 139
(1993).
251
Sarah Trombley, Visions and Revisions: Fanvids and Fair Use, 25 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 647, 681–82 (2007).
252
ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 277 (1998).
253
MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND COUNTERPUBLICS (2002).
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used in cultural studies to denote the subordination of particular
identities by a dominant ideological hegemony; the “subaltern’s
place [in society] is subsumed within . . . an experience of oppression which privileges particular exemplars as the ‘proper’ figures
of identity.”254 Warner’s analysis of the struggles that bring individuals together as a public postulates that “subaltern counterpublics” usually articulate alternative power relations with the dominant public defined by race, gender, sexual orientation, and other
subordinated status.255 According to Warner, a counterpublic
maintains “an awareness of its subordinate status . . . [with respect]
not just to ideas or policy questions but to the speech genres and
mode of address that constitute the public.”256
Stuart Hall has also defined the taking of an existing meaning
and reappropriating it for new meanings as “trans-coding.”257 He
explained that repressed groups may use trans-coding strategies to
reverse stereotypes, substitute negative portrayals with positive
ones, or contest subordinate representations from within.258 This
notion of recoding is arguably applicable to the transformation doctrine in the fair use defense of copyright law. In copyright fair use,
the pertinent inquiry for transformativeness is whether the secondary work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”259 Many trans-coding practices, especially in appropriation
art, can be said to be “transformative” in this way.260 A countercultural or counterpublic agenda may be best communicated to
254

Id. at 92.
Id. at 44–63, 117–20.
256
Id. at 119.
257
Stuart Hall, The Spectacle of the “Other,” in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL
REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 223, 270 (1997). The term
“transfunctionalize” has also been used to describe how subcultures assign new and often
contradictory meanings to signs as understood by mainstream society. See PAUL
NATHANSON, OVER THE RAINBOW: THE WIZARD OF OZ AS A SECULAR MYTH OF AMERICA
241 (1991).
258
Hall, supra note 257, at 270–75.
259
Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
260
See generally David Tan, What Do Judges Know About Contemporary Art?: Richard
Prince and Reimagining the Fair Use Test in Copyright Law, 16 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 381
(2011); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Legal Protection of Postmodern Art, in
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 254 (2003).
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mainstream society through the use of widely recognized semiotic
signs to which the public have ascribed particular representative
values or characteristics. Hence “recoding, like flag burning, may
advance an ‘associative’ type of discourse using the currency of
symbolic referents . . . [realizing] its potential for promoting personal expression, self-government, and the pursuit of truth.”261 In
the area of copyright, parodies, fan fiction, and appropriation art
are the best examples of trans-coding practices where an irreverent
portrayal of an iconic literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work
has recoded its semiotic meanings to express a different or counterviewpoint that creates new insights and understandings, thus rendering the secondary use “transformative” in nature. Rebecca
Tushnet explains that fans add new characters, stories, or twists to
the existing versions of novels and television programs:
Rather than displacing sales of the original, fanworks encourage and sustain a vibrant fan community that helps authorized versions thrive—Harry
Potter, CSI, Star Trek, and other successful works
are at the center of enormous creative fandoms containing hundreds of thousands of fanworks . . . .
Transformativeness in fanworks takes many forms,
from critique to celebration to reworking a text so
that it better addresses the concerns of a specific
audience.262
Indeed, one of the most prevalent creative practices of fan
communities is “transformation by excavation,”263 where new fan
works creatively illuminate something about the originals by reworking the canonical versions. I have previously maintained that
“in their interpretive activities, fans may arguably, as fair use,
comment or criticize the canonical universe of the original author,
create parodies of the original works or to express their own creative teleologies that draw on the primacy of the canon.”264 As
Tushnet contends, if a work was used as a building block for an ar261

Note, supra note 21, at 1499.
Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 497, 503 (2008); see generally Noda, supra note 224.
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Tushnet, supra note 262, at 503.
264
Tan, supra note 99, at 96.
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gument, it should be understood as possessing a transformative
purpose, in contrast to a work that was created purely for its entertainment value.265 Randall Bezanson similarly argues that adopting
other people’s speech should be protected by the First Amendment when it is “sufficiently transformative to support the assertion of intent to speak for oneself and, as importantly, to identify a
new expression that justifies calling the First Amendment into
play.”266
C. Advancing First Amendment Goals Through Semiotic
Transformation
In trademark law, courts have often directly engaged with the
First Amendment, whether in an infringement or a dilution claim,
as trademark law does not have a built-in First Amendment safeguard. Hence, courts have resorted to accommodating the First
Amendment within doctrinal grounds, like in the likelihood of confusion analysis for infringement and the non-commercial use and
parody exceptions for dilution actions.267 For instance, the Second
Circuit noted that since the likelihood of confusion test “is at best
awkward in the context of parody, which must evoke the original
and constitutes artistic expression,” courts should apply the factors “with proper weight given to First Amendment considerations.”268 The Ninth Circuit in Mattel v. MCA Records commented
that when marks “transcend their identifying purpose” and “enter
public discourse and become an integral part of our vocabulary,”
they “assume[] a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”269
265

Tushnet, supra note 262, at 506.
Randall P. Bezanson, Speaking Through Others’ Voices: Authorship, Originality, and
Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1056 (2003).
267
The canon of constitutional avoidance dictates that courts should “construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent
of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Courts must first attempt to resolve any conflict
between trademark law and the First Amendment by interpreting trademark claims
narrowly and trademark defenses broadly in ways that protect expression. See Lisa P.
Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 381,
448; see generally Tan, Semiotics of Alpha Brands, supra note 228.
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Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 886 F.2d 490, 495 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1989).
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Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). In 1997, Aqua
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Where a mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment protections come into play. In these situations, the Ninth
Circuit observed that “the trademark owner does not have the
right to control public discourse whenever the public imbues his
mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function.”270
More broadly, the court cautioned: “Were we to ignore the expressive value that some marks assume, trademark rights would grow to
encroach upon the zone protected by the First Amendment.”271
Similarly, the First Circuit shares the view that “[t]rademark rights
do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark
by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of
view.”272
Mattel, through impressive marketing, has established Barbie
as “the ideal American woman” and a “symbol of American girlhood” for many.273 To sell its product, Mattel uses associations of
beauty, wealth, and glamour. In Mattel v. Walking Mountain Productions, artist Thomas Forsythe turns this image on its head by displaying carefully positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled looking
Barbies in often ridiculous and apparently dangerous situations. In
finding that Thomas Forsythe’s photographs, which portrayed a
nude Barbie doll in danger of being attacked by vintage household
appliances, was transformative, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
“Forsythe presents the viewer with a different set of associations
and a different context for this plastic figure.”274 The court commented:
It is not difficult to see the commentary that Forsythe intended or the harm that he perceived in
Barbie’s influence on gender roles and the position
of women in society . . . . By developing and transforming associations with Mattel’s Barbie doll, Forsythe has created the sort of social criticism and paonto “Top 40” music charts. The defendants, MCA Records and a number of other
music companies, produced, marketed, and sold “Barbie Girl.” Id.
270
Id.; see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th
Cir. 1992).
271
MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900.
272
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1987).
273
MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 898.
274
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003).

368

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVI:311

rodic speech protected by the First Amendment and
promoted by the Copyright Act.275
Courts rarely refer to the First Amendment when evaluating
transformative use in copyright disputes. However, the Ninth Circuit Mattel decisions are notable for their more overt mention of
the protection that the First Amendment confers over commentary, criticism, and parody that may be affected by engaging with a
copyrighted work as a semiotic sign infused with established connotations. The Fourth Circuit alluded to the marketplace of ideas
and participatory democracy rationales of the First Amendment
when it posited that fair use “protects filmmakers and documentarians from the inevitable chilling effects of allowing an artist too
much control over the dissemination of his or her work” and “is
crucial to the exchange of opinions and ideas.”276
It seems that the Supreme Court is not too concerned about
keeping the marketplace of ideas and the participatory democracy
theory distinct, as evident in its frequent pronouncements. For example, the Court stated that the First Amendment “was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people”277 and to enable
“the practice of persons sharing common views banding together
to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process.”278 Generally, political speech covers all discussion
on public issues, especially if intended by the speaker to influence
governmental action.279 Political speech has been defined by commentators as speech that falls into one of the following categories:
either it (1) is “a reasoned, cognitive connection to some identifiable political issue that has the potential of entering the legislative
arena”;280 (2) is that “which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal”;281 or (3) occurs “when it is
275

Id. at 803.
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 944 (4th Cir. 2013).
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Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
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both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue.”282 Although art and entertainment, as embodied in literary, musical, dramatic, and artistic works, are protected
by the First Amendment as having value in themselves, courts often examine their “political value.” This is demonstrated by decisions that assess their contribution to public debate through the
articulation of a particular viewpoint or through critical commentary or parody.283 The transformative use doctrine can clearly accommodate the First Amendment rationales of marketplace of
ideas and participatory democracy, where greater protection may
be given to unauthorized uses of copyrighted works that promote
attention to public issues and engender public debate.
In order for speech to be accommodated adequate breathing
space, it would be beneficial to understand the free speech issues in
the copyright fair use defense within the context of a First
Amendment theory that “preserves the independence of public
discourse so that a democratic will within a culturally heterogeneous state can emerge under conditions of neutrality, and so that
individuals can use the medium of public discourse to persuade
others to experiment in new forms of community life.”284 Instead
of burning a flag or a cross, or wearing black armbands, one might
draw Mouseketeer caps on President Obama’s head or depict Superman being crushed by foreign powers when engaging in political
commentary. Gays and lesbians may subvert conventional portrayals of Disney’s princes and princesses to highlight their social marginalization. A number of commentators have alluded to this possibility. For example, Trombley suggests that the view put forth in
“slash fanvid” may “require a radical reappraisal of characters’
motives, the plot, and authorial intent . . . [and] also demonstrates
the ways in which such transformative use edges towards political
commentary that may deserve protection under the First Amendment.”285
282

SUNSTEIN, PROBLEM WITH FREE SPEECH, supra note 137, at 130.
In a right of publicity context, see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th
Cir. 2003); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
284
Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 136, at 684.
285
Trombley, supra note 251, at 665–66. The fan-made music video, or “fanvid,”
comprises of the re-cutting of footage from a television or film source to a new
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In the United States, the “structural barriers or limits of class
[that] would obstruct [the] process of cultural absorption” have
not assisted the “democratic enfranchisement of all citizens within
political society.”286 Reading copyrighted works semiotically can
reveal how such signs can “reproduce the existing social struggles
in their images, spectacle, and narrative.”287 Indeed, there is a significant emphasis in contemporary cultural studies on the notion of
audience participation—be it their complicity or resistance—in the
hegemony of cultural texts propagated by their authors or producers.288 It is in these studies of semiotic disruptions that one may
find the relevant tools for establishing a conceptual framework
within the transformative use doctrine that addresses the political
agenda of the active audience.
In right of publicity jurisprudence, the First Amendment defense is a shield against liability for the commercial appropriation of
identity.289 There are different articulations of the First Amendment defense in myriad state jurisdictions, but the “transformative
elements” test, also known as the “transformative use” test, initiated by the California Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions v.
Saderup290 has been widely adopted.291 It draws from the first factor

omitting dialogue or voice-over narration) or the “musical montage,” which often ends
episodes of television dramas. The popular subgenre of “slash” fanvids explores the
possibility of reading relationships between presumptively (by mainstream standards)
heterosexual characters as queer. Fanvids are therefore perceived as a form of cultural
appropriation by individual artists who transform the works of others for different ends.
Id. at 650–52.
286
Stuart Hall, supra note 245, at 56, 60.
287
DOUGLAS KELLNER, MEDIA CULTURE: CULTURAL STUDIES, IDENTITY AND POLITICS
BETWEEN THE MODERN AND THE POSTMODERN 56 (1995).
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THEORY OF PERFORMANCE AND IMAGINATION (1998); IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING
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MATTERS: EVERYDAY CULTURE AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1996); JONATHAN GRAY,
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See MCCARTHY, supra note 114, §§ 3:1, 8:22–:39 (2014); Tan, Political Recoding,
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See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
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of the fair use defense in copyright law:292 an unauthorized use of
celebrity identity would be permitted if it was “transformative.” In
adjudging what might qualify as “transformative” and hence protected by the First Amendment, literal depictions like Andy Warhol’s silkscreens of celebrities have been said to be transformative
because they convey a particular critical viewpoint.293 The California Supreme Court commented that despite a low degree of visual
transformation in the silkscreens, “[t]hrough distortion and the
careful manipulation of context, Warhol was able to convey a message that went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”294 This suggests that contextual transformations—like the recoded use of a celebrity identity to challenge the majoritarian values that the celebrity sign represents—
would merit First Amendment protection.
Building on Jürgen Habermas’ work on the public sphere,295
Michael Warner’s analysis of the struggles that bring individuals
together as a public postulates that “subaltern counterpublics”
usually articulate alternative power relations with the dominant
public defined by race, gender, sexual orientation, and other subordinated status.296 Counterpublics are “counter” to the extent that
they try to supply different ways of imagining participation within a
political or social hierarchy by which its members’ identities are
formed and transformed.297 A counterpublic use of a particular
well-known copyrighted work can acquire a political dimension,
and may be seen as a “discursive space . . . for contesting and en-

292

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Music,
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heavy-handed lampooning to subtle social criticism.” Id. at 809.
294
Id. at 811.
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JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., 1989).
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WARNER, supra note 253, at 44–63, 117–20.
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gendering the American character.”298 From a semiotics perspective, the political agenda of counterpublics or subaltern groups may
be best communicated to mainstream society through the use of
widely recognized copyrighted works as “signs” to which the public have ascribed particular representative values or characteristics.
In particular, copyrighted works that are constitutive of cultural
heritage—like Mickey Mouse, Superman, Captain America, and
Barbie—each transcend the works that bear these names, and are
symbolic of the ideological hegemonies of social identities in contemporary society. Their recoding by counterpublics may be
viewed as “[p]ractices of articulating social difference [that] are
central to democratic politics.”299
Through recoding practices—which transform the original
work through the creation of “new information, new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings”300—subaltern groups are able to
advance their political ideologies and assert alternative identities
that “affirm both community solidarity and the legitimacy of their
social difference by empowering themselves with cultural resources
that the law deems the properties of others.”301 The rewriting of
the well-known Roy Orbison hit song “Oh, Pretty Woman” to refer to a “big hairy woman” and a “bald headed woman” reasonably could be perceived as commenting on or criticizing the notions
of beauty or naiveté suggested by the original work.302 Similarly,
the spoof of Annie Leibovitz’s celebrity portrait,303 the poignant
298

Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual
Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.,
49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 164–65 (1996).
299
COOMBE, supra note 252, at 295; see also WARNER, supra note 253, at 210.
300
Leval, supra note 28, at 1111.
301
COOMBE, supra note 252, at 366; see also Jacqueline D. Lipton & John Tehranian,
Derivative Works 2.0: Reconsidering Transformative Use in the Age of Crowdsourced Creation,
109 NW. U.L. REV. 383, 401 (2015) (“transformative interactions with creative works also
advance identity formation and expressive interests by mediating the development of
cultural networks, regulating or undermining insider-outsider relationships, and
demarcating or blurring social strata”).
302
Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
303
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Apart from
ridiculing pretentiousness, the ad might also be reasonably perceived as interpreting the
Leibovitz photograph to extol the beauty of the pregnant female body, and rather
unchivalrously, to express disagreement with this message.”).
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retelling of Gone With The Wind,304 the subversive criticism of Mattel’s depiction of the Barbie doll by Thomas Forsythe,305 the new
insights to Andreas Blanch’s fashion photograph provided by Jeff
Koons,306 and the new aesthetics of Richard Prince’s appropriation
art307 not only contribute significantly to the marketplace of ideas
but also challenge majoritarian viewpoints and provoke public debate about American ideals and values. Although these decisions
regarding fair use do not refer to the First Amendment, one can
discern its subliminal presence guiding the interpretation of transformative use that impels a march toward finding more breathing
space for secondary works that advance First Amendment goals.
Viewed in this light, the judgment handed down in 1978 by the
Ninth Circuit in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates would have
been wrongly decided; in that case, the individual defendants published two issues of cartoon comics entitled Air Pirates Funnies
which portrayed a number of well-recognized Disney characters in
unflattering scenarios. The themes of defendants’ publications differ markedly from those of Disney. The Ninth Circuit advanced
the observation that:
[T]he “Air Pirates” was “an ‘underground’ comic
book which had placed several well-known Disney
304

Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011) (“It is
principally and purposefully a critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the
perspective, judgments, and mythology of [the original novel].”).
305
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
that Forsythe, the defendant, described the message of his photographic series as “an
attempt to ‘critique [] the objectification of women associated with [Barbie], and [][to]
lambast [] the conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects
because this is what Barbie embodies.’” (internal citations omitted)).
306
Koons II, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The sharply different objectives that
Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating ‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transformative
nature of the use.”). According to Jeff Koons, he was “using Blanch’s image as fodder for
his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media” and he wanted
“the viewer to think about his/her personal experience with these objects, products, and
images and at the same time gain new insight into how these affect our lives.” Id. at 252–
53.
307
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Prince’s Canal Zone artworks
relate to a ‘post-apocalyptic screenplay’ Prince had planned, and ‘emphasize themes [of
Prince’s planned screenplay] of equality of the sexes; highlight “the three relationships in
the world, which are men and women, men and men, and women and women”; and
portray a contemporary take on the music scene.’”).
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cartoon characters in incongruous settings where
they engaged in activities clearly antithetical to the
accepted Mickey Mouse world of scrubbed faces,
bright smiles and happy endings.” It centered
around “a rather bawdy depiction of the Disney
characters as active members of a free thinking,
promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture.”308
Each issue of the Pirates’ books was marked “Adults Only.”
The cover of the first issue showed Mickey Mouse piloting an
open-cockpitted, propeller-powered plane with two sacks labeled
“Dope” tied to its fuselage. The image has been lifted from the
cover of a Disney comic, Mickey the Mail Pilot, with the word
“Dope” having replaced the original word, “Mail.” The cover of
the second issue depicted Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse on
horseback, hands raised, confronted by a bat-winged, cloaked figure with a revolver in one hand and the “Dope” sacks in the other.
The Ninth Circuit accepted that the Air Pirates Funnies had targeted the original Disney characters and had “parodied their personalities, their wholesomeness, and their innocence.”309 This is
therefore unequivocally a target parody310 and like 2 Live Crew’s
song “Pretty Woman” in Campbell, it “reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree.”311 In fact, the defense attorneys for Air Pirates argued that
the creators of Air Pirates Funnies were respected parodists following in the footsteps of Cervantes, Swift, Whitman, Hemingway,
and Faulkner, that the countercultural comics were aimed at adult
hippies not children, that these comics were not competing with
308

Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Note,
Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564, 571, 582 (1976)).
309
Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 758. It was also noted that there were satirical elements
present as well. Id. at 758 n.15 (“[T]he ‘Air Pirates’ were parodying life and society in
addition to parodying the Disney characters. Such an effect is almost an inherent aspect of
any parody.”).
310
Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (“For the purposes of
copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote
from existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to
create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works.”). On the
difference between target and weapon parodies, see Richard A. Posner, When is Parody
Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 70–71 (1992).
311
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
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any past, current, or future Disney creations, and that the Disneybuying public was unlikely to have its cravings for Mickey Mouse
satisfied by an issue of Air Pirates Funnies.312 In Dan O’Neill’s affidavit, he said:
[W]e approach Mickey Mouse as our major American mythology . . . . I chose to parody exactly the
style of drawing and the characters to evoke the response created by Disney. My purpose in using the
Mouse as a character is not to destroy the Disney
product, but to deal with the image in the American
consciousness that the Disney image implanted.313
Unfortunately, it was this close copying of the original Disney
characters in Walt Disney that precluded the defendants from relying on the fair use defense, despite the high degree of transformativeness in terms of the parodic purpose of Air Pirates Funnies.
In 1978, the standards for applying the fair use defense in parody cases, like the standards for applying fair use in other contexts,
have been a source of considerable attention and dispute, with a
number of Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit decisions consistently
focused on the substantiality of the taking.314 In Walt Disney, the
defendants presented a contrasting countercultural critical work
that attacked the Disney myth. They argued that Mickey Mouse
had become “part of the national collective unconscious” and an
internationally known symbol of American culture and power;
while Mickey is usually perceived as innocent and delightful, he
has now been recoded in Air Pirates Funnies as a reactionary force
devoted to Establishment values and an enthusiastic promoter of
capitalism and unrestrained violence,315 a representation which
challenged the morality espoused by Disney. Today, such a use

312

BOB LEVIN, THE PIRATES AND THE MOUSE: DISNEY’S WAR AGAINST THE
COUNTERCULTURE 98 (2003).
313
Id. at 100. O’Neill was also reported to have said: “The closer you draw the parody,
the greater the shock, the greater the criticism.” Id. at 101.
314
E.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966);
Benny v. Loew’s, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
315
LEVIN, supra note 312, at 98–99.
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would probably qualify as a form of “transformation by excavation.”316
In the same vein, the placement of a Mouseketeer cap on the
President of the United States or the former Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party would infringe Disney’s copyright in the
graphical image of Mickey Mouse. It is a perfect shorthand to express one’s criticism of the incumbent political ideology.317 Disney
can connote “unquestioning patriotism, bourgeois moral nostrums,
gauche middle-class taste, racist elitism, corporate profitmongering, and bland standards of social conformity.”318 Such expressions also may, borrowing a phrase from the Supreme Court in
Campbell, “reasonably be perceived as commenting on the original
or criticizing it, to some degree,”319 through the introduction of
new insights and understandings into the Disney corporation’s
close connection with governments320 and Disney’s highly successful “mass-mediated utopian typifications . . . that structure personal values and ideology,”321 much like how these two political leaders strive to advance democratic and communist dogmas respectively in their own countries.
Likewise, the myth of the American superheroes as portrayed
in Marvel and DC Comics can also be read to encompass a secularization of religion and the themes of salvation and redemption.322
The powers that are earlier reserved for God and his angelic beings
are transferred to an Everyman, and the virtuous qualities associated with God now reside within the superheroes. Richard Rey316

Tushnet, supra note 262, at 503.
Such countercultural merchandise is currently commercially available for purchase
on websites. See, e.g., THOSESHIRTS.COM, http://www.thoseshirts.com/mic.html
[http://perma.cc/FG6P-XARR] (last visited Oct. 12, 2015); TSHIRTBORDELLO.COM,
http://www.tshirtbordello.com/Mickey-Mao-T-Shirt
[http://perma.cc/459W-Z4NZ]
(last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
318
LEVIN, supra note 312, at 79; see also Lee Artz, Monarchs, Monsters, and
Multiculturalism: Disney’s Menu for Global Hierarchy, in RETHINKING DISNEY: PRIVATE
CONTROL, PUBLIC DIMENSION 75, 82 (Mike Budd & Max H. Kirsch eds., 2005) (arguing
that Disney’s representations “promote capitalist hegemony and political quiescence”).
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Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
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nolds observes that “[f]or Americans, the historical path from Munich to Pearl Harbor coincides with the emergence of Superman
and Captain America—solitary but socialized heroes who engage in
battle from time to time as proxies of U.S. foreign policy.”323
These myths or semiotic connotations of Superman as the idealization of a heroic America, with its messianic overtones and both
Captain America and Wonder Woman as emblems of American
patriotism, are well-recognized by readers of DC and Marvel Comics around the world. Here, myths refer not simply to a falsehood,
but to narrative tales which “function to express social values,
norms of behaviors, and/or the consequences of deviating from
them.”324 As themes of political content, power and responsibility,
ability and disability, good and evil, as well as gender and eroticism
continue to be explored through the semiotic signs of the superheroes, it is evident that different sets of moral, social, and ideological
positions are personified by different superhero characters. It is
upon the bedrock of the Golden Age of Superheroes created in the
1930s–1940s—like Superman, Batman, Captain America, and
Wonder Woman—that other artistic works spring to challenge,
deconstruct, and satirize these well-known modern myths. Artist
R. Sumantri MS’s controversial works in the China New Supreme
Power series depict a number of battle scenes between the Golden
Age superheroes and well-known Chinese deities all resulting in a
devastating defeat of the American heroes.325 This postmodern political commentary of the ascendancy of China and the decline of
the United States as a global superpower is most effectively conveyed through the use of these superheroes whose semiotic meanings are arguably universally recognized. Such infringing uses of
copyrighted characters in political speech would undoubtedly
summon the attention of the First Amendment, and its recognition
as such would add significantly to a more nuanced analysis of the
fair use defense.
323

RICHARD REYNOLDS, SUPERHEROES: A MODERN MYTHOLOGY 17 (1994).
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INSIGHTS 13 (4th ed., 2004).
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For an analysis of the transformative use of the semiotic superhero signs, see David
Tan, The Transformative Potential of Countercultural Recoding in Copyright Law: A Study of
Superheroes and Fair Use, in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES,
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CONCLUSION
It might be correct that “[b]ecause of the First Amendment
principles built into copyright law through the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use, courts often need not entertain related First Amendment arguments in a copyright case.”326
But what this built-in accommodation entails is an obviation for the
need for a separate or additional judicial scrutiny of copyright legislation so long as the doctrines of idea/expression dichotomy and
fair use remain undisturbed. It does not mean that the rationales of
the First Amendment or the degree of abridgment of speech should
be completely ignored when evaluating fair use.
Leval’s legacy has lasted twenty-five years and it is likely to
continue to be the engine that will drive fair use jurisprudence in
the Supreme Court and a majority of the Circuit Courts. The freedom to transformatively appropriate an original work in the service
of creativity is not only compatible with the objectives of the Copyright Clause, but also advances the goals of the First Amendment.
The first thing that usually springs to mind when one mentions
books, songs, films, and art is how a restriction on their circulation
might trespass on the First Amendment. Yet for the past two decades, the courts have deliberately skirted around any discussion of
the First Amendment when addressing liability for copyright infringement.
The participatory theory of the First Amendment supports the
protection of the making of “representations about self, identity,
community, solidarity, and difference” or the articulation of political and social aspirations using these copyright signs within a “di-
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Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011); see also
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that where the works in
question are “by definition under copyright,” the works are “on the latter half of the
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alogic democracy”327 as political speech. In First Amendment jurisprudence, certain recoded circulations can be viewed as a form of
political activism characterized by their ability to “reverse perceptions of social devaluation or stigma, articulate alternative narratives of national understanding, and challenge exclusionary imaginaries of citizenship.”328 Propertizing expressive works enables the
owner to restrict speech, impede the free flow of ideas, and control
democratic dialogue. Copyright laws should ultimately aim to
strike a balance between protecting, on the one hand, the proprietary right of the author/creator to economically exploit the fruits of
his labor, and on the other hand, the right of others to proffer alternative insights, create new understandings, and express political
viewpoints through connotative recoded uses of the copyrighted
sign. It is only by reimagining the world of copyright as a semiotic
universe that “the promise of First Amendment”329 can be understood and its lost language recovered.
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